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Abstract
Did the “except for punishment for a crime” (exception punishment) clause o f the 
first section of the Thirteenth Amendment provide a platform for states to revise, and 
create if necessary, laws to target blacks and imprison them, thus denying them their 
rights and create a labor force through the agency of mass incarceration? This author 
begins with the assumption that it did. The purpose of this thesis study is to explore this 
question and find if the author’s assumption is correct -  whether the exception 
punishment clause permitted slavery and involuntary servitude to exist as a labor system 
despite the intent o f the Thirteenth Amendment. This thesis begins with the exploration 
of the Thirteenth Amendment and its relationship to systems of involuntary servitude 
from 1890-1920, which serves as the period covered for the duration of the study. The 
main intent of this study is to review the construction and meaning of the exception 
punishment clause o f the Thirteenth Amendment; explore vagrancy laws; define peonage 
as well as identify the conditions and the mechanics of its perpetuation; and address as 
well as discuss the role o f the state and state actors in peonage enforcement or the lack 
thereof. Mississippi operates as the unit of analysis for exploring the state statutes 
regarding vagrancy. Alabama is the focus of the exploration of state and state actors 
activity in peonage. Numerous cases are discussed to interpret the roles of state and 
federal governments. Most of the cases are federal in nature (two of the cases are state- 
level). The study ends with the author’s finding and determination of his assumption.
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Introduction
Forms of involuntary servitude have been discussed by numerous scholars and 
historians who have inquired about its existence after the ratification and adoption of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Pete Daniel focuses on the life of peonage from the beginning of 
the twentieth century to 1969, which persisted under economic, political and legal 
justification.1 Douglas Blackmon writes on the various forms, paying particular attention 
to peonage and its legal counterpart, convict-leasing and discusses criminal-surety and 
vagrancy.2 These systems often interlocked; however, they could also exist separately. 
Why were these systems so difficult to eradicate, even after the adoption of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the enactment additional legislation necessary to enforce the 
Amendment?
This question has led to this author’s inquiry of the “except as punishment for a 
crime” clause (referred to as the punishment exception clause throughout the thesis) of 
the Thirteenth Amendment to seek an answer. Was it possible that states may manipulate 
through legislative enactments the punishment exception clause to target a population and 
submit its members to slavery and involuntary servitude? Was there any motivation for 
it? This author argues that there was an overuse of police power, or manipulation of 
legislative enactments to punish a target population, motivated by a desire to carry on the 
social hierarchy of slave times.
1 See generally Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 1972).
2 See generally Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement o f Black Americans 




This author has consulted and reviewed the Congressional Globe with particular 
focus to the Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Congresses, the Thirteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Government Archives online (www.archives.gov and 
www.memory.loc.gov), the Government Publishing Office website (www.gpo.gov), 
cases, the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, articles and law reviews. The cases, Peonage 
Abolition Act, articles, and law reviews were accessed via JStor, Westlaw and 
LexisNexis databases. The scope of the period covered is limited: 1890-1920. Any 
information outside of this period is meant to support the viral persistence of involuntary 
servitude in its various forms. One exception is the peonage story at the beginning of the 
second chapter. The details help explain the depth and potency of peonage as a system.
The study is broken down into an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. 
Three appendices are included to share with the reader primary documents as well as 
supplementary information and sources. The thesis is completed with the bibliography, 
which is categorized by type of source.
The first chapter explores public understanding, the Court’s doctrinal approach to 
Thirteenth Amendment interpretation, and scholarly understanding of the Thirteenth 
Amendment -  its power, reach, scope, interpretation, and application -  with particular 
attention to the punishment exception. Sources utilized are the Thirteenth Amendment 
text as well as supporting articles from legal scholars to include Alvani Hasini, Steve A. 
Howe, William M. Carter, Jr., George Rutherglen, and Darrell A. H. Miller. This chapter 
is also informed by the historical works Paul Finkelman, Pete Daniel and Douglas
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Blackmon. Additional sources consulted were popular websites devoted to the 
constitution as well as academic and educational material. The focus of the first chapter is 
on the punishment exception clause in the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment.
This author contends that the clause permitted slavery and involuntary servitude so long 
as it was punishment for a crime for those duly convicted and the South took full 
advantage of the clause, criminalizing nearly every aspects of black life in the South. 
Immigrants, briefly mentioned, are sure not to escape the entire conversation as they 
suffered the plight of involuntary servitude masked as labor opportunities, though short in 
comparison with African Americans.
The second chapter discusses vagrancy laws. While vagrancy laws operated as 
one of the gateways through which a person could enter the punishment exception- 
justified slavery and involuntary servitude, it has a longer history than all other criminal 
statutes enacted. Vagrancy is treated differently based on this fact and its association with 
crimes against the public rather than a violation of contractual obligation. This chapter 
will explore vagrancy statutes, their enforcement by officers of the law and judicial 
administrators and their constitutionality based on U.S. courts’ jurisprudence, and 
scholarly reasoning and interpretation. Attention to how Southern states used vagrancy 
laws in support of the Black Codes is extremely important to this study, for it will 
provide a fundamental understanding to its involvement in systems of involuntary 
servitude. Mississippi's vagrancy statutes will take the primary role in analysis.
For this chapter, the author has consulted and reviewed books, articles and law 
reviews as well as statutes. The statutes, articles as law reviews were found in JStor, 
Westlaw, and LexisNexis databases. The chapter provides a brief legal history of
12
vagrancy, which transitioned from the English legal system to the U.S. legal system as 
well as a brief overview of the theories of crime and their relation to social control. It also 
analyzes vagrancy laws used in the post-Civil War South to provide an understanding of 
how it operated within the context of the Thirteenth Amendment, if at all. The 
interconnectedness and exchangeability between vagrancy and other systems of 
involuntary servitude are intermittently referenced. Lastly, it reviews the constitutionality 
of the vagrancy statutes, with attention to court rulings as well as constitutional attacks on 
vagrancy laws. The table provided provides a simple visual of the legal information 
acquired from the law. The image of the labor contract was adapted from the National 
Archives webpage.
The third and final chapter focuses on peonage and its counterpart, the convict­
leasing system. This author chiefly consults the works of Daniel, Blackmon and N. 
Gordon Carper as well as the Congressional Globe and a series of peonage cases and 
other laws pertaining to peonage. This chapter endeavors to explore the history of 
peonage in America from 1890-1920, to convey the legality, yet illegality, of the peonage 
and convict-leasing systems under the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
and the Peonage Abolition Act (PAA). What were the conditions of peonage? How did 
one enter into peonage? What was the socioeconomic atmosphere that contributed to 
peonage? Who was principally affected, or victimized, by peonage? This study endeavors 
to explore these questions and provide descriptions and responses to them. It also 
discusses the existence of peonage as a form of involuntary servitude, its abolishment by 
law, its perpetuation by local and state governments and the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions and doctrines that establish case law concerning peonage.
13
Since peonage and vagrancy were different modes of entry into involuntary 
servitude, they are treated as such. Peonage primarily functioned under civil law whereas 
vagrancy functioned under criminal law -  one concerned private parties before the judge, 
and the other was an exercise of state police power, characterized by public encounters of 
law enforcement officials and private persons. Peonage resulted from both contract labor 
drawn between an employer and laborer privately, or by sanction of law. It is important 
to note the distinctions and treat them differently based on those distinctions.
Chapter 1: The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment is the first constitutional amendment that expanded 
federal government power to regulate activities that were otherwise governed by states. 
Slavery had existed before the founding fathers drafted the Constitution and the states 
ratified it. States bickered over where slavery would legally exist -  primarily in the 
South. As citizens began to question the morality of slavery, abolitionism grew and 
spread as a movement. The issue, which became embedded in the fabric of the nation, 
became one that tore the nation apart and sparked a war.
Not only did the controversy over the legal institution of slavery disrupt social, 
economic and moral life, it disrupted politics. Its virility incited secession. Southern 
states began to secede and the remaining states’ representatives continued to debate the 
political and legal status of slavery within the United States. Politicians mounted
’ Joe William Trotter, Jr., The African American Experience (Houghton Mifflin Co.: New York), 227-32. 
See also Sandra L. Rierson, “The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution,” Vermont Law Review 
35 (2011): 834-44.
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impassioned attacks against the institution of slavery as well as in support of it.4 The 
stagnation of Congress on the issue became so politically disheartening that it prompted 
President Lincoln to implore it to pass the amendment, which Congress passed one month 
later.3 Exactly one year after Lincoln’s imploring, the Thirteenth Amendment became 
part of the Constitution.6
The first clause prohibits the existence of slavery and involuntary servitude 
anywhere within the United States, including its territories, it is not a question that the 
Thirteenth Amendment was drafted to deal with the issue that was at hand at the time -  
African enslavement (chattel slavery) in the U.S., but the language suggests that it is 
reaches beyond chattel slavery and abolishes any system of involuntary servitude.
4 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1863), 17-21. On December 14, 1863, Senator John P. Hale of 
New Hampshire introduced a bill to quell the rebellion in the South, which declared equality among all 
persons within the United States and abolished any claims to personal service with the exception of that 
held in contractual obligation, parental claim to service performed by a child and service performed in 
execution of a sentence for criminal punishment. Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois introduced a 
similar bill. Lovejoy’s bill contained three sections: 1) forever abolish slavery and involuntary servitude 
except as criminal punishment upon due conviction and declaration of those held in slavery or involuntary 
servitude to be free; 2) provide protections to the freed person and give them legal rights -  sue, be sued and 
testify in court cases; and 3) criminalize the act of returning, or attempting to return, a person freed under 
the act, subjecting offenders to an indictment and prosecution of a high misdemeanor and sentencing to be 
limited to not less than one year but not to exceed five and a fine of $1,000 - $5,000. Representative James 
F. Wilson of Iowa introduced a joint resolution in the House to submit to Congress, which was designed 
with legislative intent to forever abolish slavery, permit involuntary servitude only as punishment for a 
crime. The second section of the joint resolution gave Congress the power to enforce the first section 
through the means of appropriate legislation. Each of these resolutions endeavored to bring an end to 
slavery.
Ibid., 1489-1490. Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware rallied against an amendment that would abolish 
slavery nationwide, reasoning that states retain the power to abolish slavery within their own territories. In 
response, Saulsbury proposed an amendment himself. See Appendix I for text of Saulsbury's proposed 
amendment.
5 Ibid., 2nd Sess. (1865), 3. Lincoln states, in his message to Congress, “At the last session of Congress a 
proposed amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout the United States passed the 
Senate, but failed for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives. Although, the 
present is the same Congress, and nearly the same members, and without questioning the wisdom or 
patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of the 
measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question has not changed; but an intervening election 
shows, almost certainly, that the next Congress will pass the measure if this one does not.”
6 U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation, 
Centennial Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,” report prepared by 
the Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 30.
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However, an important question has yet to be answered: What was meant by “except as 
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted?” Or, more to 
the point, how was it meant to be used as a public policy provision?7 The above clause is 
similar to the exception clause in sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance (1787). What 
motivated this clause to be included in the Ordinance? The Journals o f the Continental 
Congress does not provide much on the matter. Article VI does not appear in the second
O Q
reading of the ordinance on July 11, 1787; however, it appears on the day of voting.
Paul Finkelman notes that there was very little debate about including the 
provision in the Ordinance. He suggests that no slavery in the Northwest Territory may 
have been perceived as a benefit by the Southern states and thus permitted to be part of 
the Ordinance.10 The clause that prohibited slavery also allowed for it, a contradiction 
due to ambiguity. The lack of clarification, Finkelman argues, made it insufficient to deal 
with the regulations of slave treatment and slave status.11 The incorporation of this text 
into the Thirteenth Amendment presents the same issue, which is discussed in the 
‘Academic Understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment’ section.
7 U.S. Constitution, amend. 13, § 1.
8 U.S., Second Continental Congress, Journals o f the Continental Congress, Vol. 32 (1787), 333. The day 
before, the draft had been revised and still the sixth article was nonexistent. See also Ibid., 319-20.
9 U.S., Second Continental Congress, Journals o f the Continental Congress, Vol. 32, 343.
10 Paul Finkelman, “Slavery and Bondage in the ‘Empire of Liberty’,” in The Northwest Ordinance: Essays 
on Its Formation, Provisions and Legacy (Michigan State University Press: East Lansing, Michigan, 1989), 
64-6. For more information on the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance, see Peter Onuf, Statehood and 




Popular understanding focuses on the explicit language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment insofar as the prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude. However, the 
punishment exception clause is not discussed much. Various sources available to the 
public, influential in shaping and determining what the Thirteenth Amendment did, 
describe the Amendment in part -  possibly in an attempt to succinctly describe the intent 
and purpose of the Amendment. Primary and secondary material relating to the 
Thirteenth Amendment have expressed similar sentiments regarding the intent and 
purpose of the Amendment. “ Contemporary government sources that discuss the 
Constitution and the Amendments, available to the public, have reiterated this 
understanding of the intent and purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment.13
“History.com” also maintains this understanding of the Amendment's intent -  
abolition of slavery. These sources are among the most sought by the American public, 
which influence its conception of the intent and purpose of Thirteenth Amendment.
These sources are correct, in part; however, each source neglects to mention or place any 
emphasis on the limitation of the Amendment -  the punishment exception clause. The 
sources containing this explanation of the Thirteenth Amendment are numerous; they
12 Various sources, which teachers may access to teach the American youth about the Thirteenth 
Amendment, suggest that the Amendment abolished slavery. See Social Studies for Kids, “The Thirteenth 
Amendment,” http://www.socialstudiesforkids.com/articles/ushistory/thirteenthamendment.htm, (accessed 
April 6, 2016). See also, Craig Walenta, “The Constitution for Kids,” U.S. Constitution Online 
http://www.usconstitution.net/constkids4.html (accessed April 6, 2016).
13 U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation, 
30.
14 History.com, “Thirteenth Amendment,” A+E Digital Networks http://www.history.com/topics/black- 
history/thirteenth-amendment (accessed April 6, 2016).
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meet the citizenry before most other sources. Thus, the limitation is often neglected in 
learning about and understanding the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Court’s Interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
Although ratified first, the Thirteenth Amendment (overshadowed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment) remained in the bottom of the Court’s toolbox, only brought 
under review when the Court deemed it necessary -  a rare occasion.1'̂  The first time it 
received recognition by the Court was in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1872). While 
Congress had been chiefly concerned with African enslavement and its abolition, the 
Court expanded the definition of the Thirteenth Amendment to include “Mexican 
Peonage” and the “Coolie labor system” in The Slaughterhouse Cases}6
The Court reasoned that these are systems of involuntary servitude and that the 
Amendment forbids involuntary servitude of any nature, under any name.17 That is the 
extent to which the Court interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court defined the 
Thirteenth Amendment in response to the legal question at hand: whether a Louisiana law 
granting a corporation exclusive rights to manage and control slaughterhouses, cattle 
farms, and regulation of fees charged for renting out such premises that are otherwise 
unavailable to any other enterprise performing in the same industry created a monopoly 
and violated the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment and the first and second 
sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenger contended that the Louisiana law
15 Litigants would bring this up in cases, but in most cases, the Supreme Court would rule that the 
Thirteenth Amendment did not apply.
16 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
17 Ibid.
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was an act that did violate these provisions. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that act 
did not, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its decision.18
The next case the Court interpreted the meaning and power of the Thirteenth 
Amendment was the Civil Rights Cases (1883). The Court mentions that the first 
provision is self-executing, meaning it does not need the aid of legislation for its force to 
be realized.19 This case includes the first judicial mention of “badges and incidents of 
slavery,” which the Court construes to be a foundation for the congressional power 
inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment. In this case, the Court tested the validity of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875. The act forbade the denial of equal accommodations in private 
and public places, to include inns, railroad cars, and theatres. It sought to provide equal 
social treatment among blacks and whites.
The Court struck down the sections (sections one and two), which ordered equal 
accommodations and held that Congress, while having power to enact laws that are 
necessary and proper to the enforcement of the first section of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, cannot enact a law that prohibits denial of equal accommodations that are 
based on “mere discriminations on account or race or color” because they were not 
regarded as badges of slavery. This decision effectively gave rise to the legal enactment
18 See generally Slaughterhouse Cases.
19 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
20 Civil Rights Cases, 25. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f 
America: Analysis and Interpretation, Centennial Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States of America,” report prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 1793. 
The report explains that the Court perceived the badges and incidents and slavery to be denial of certain 
rights (rights of civil freedom) -  the right to: marry; sue in court; be sued; testify; submit evidence; inherit; 
draft, sign and enforce contracts; and purchase, sell, lease and convey property, which were subject to 
congressional power; however equal access to accommodation and places of public amusement were not 
included in the package of badges and incidents of slavery.
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of Jim Crow policies. Southern states could resume a social hierarchy akin to that of 
slavery, interrupted by Radical Reconstruction.
Laws that protected the chastity of white women from black men were enacted. 
Accusations of black men were often invoked to either criminalize black men or kill 
them." However, sexual aggression of white men toward black women were justified by 
the rationalization that suggested black women loved to engaged in adulterous acts with 
white men and thus, they could not claim rape." Miscegenation laws were aimed at black
23men."' Such a faulty notion of black women influenced the legal perception of black 
women who were raped.
As already established, the badges and incidents of slavery is a foundation of 
congressional power inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment. Since the Court did not view 
the racial discrimination as such, it did not fall within the scope of congressional power 
granted by the Thirteenth Amendment. Social attitudes of the time played a role in the 
decision of the Court. As legal scholar William M. Carter, Jr. argues, interest 
convergence is a great contributor to positive applications of the Thirteenth Amendment 
in cases where it is brought as a claim.24 In the Civil Rights Cases, the law did not 
converge with the interest of the dominant class in society. Thus the Thirteenth 




24 See generally William M. Carter, Jr., “The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges 
and Incidents of Slavery,” Maryland Law Review 71, no. 21 (2011).
2" Civil Rights Cases, 25-6. The Court did recognize that the force of the 13th and 15th amendments could 
exercise power over equal rights: “Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as 
badges of slavery. If, since that time, the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respects has become 
established by constitutional amendment, it is not by the force of the Thirteenth Amendment (which merely
20
Hence, the Court acknowledges in its definition the congressional power to prohibit by 
enactment of law anything reminiscent of slavery, but it did not include in its 
interpretation racial discrimination. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson remark that the 
jurispathic treatment of the Thirteenth Amendment by the Court is predicated upon not
wanting to establish precedent that would disrupt the social, political and economic
26atmospheres of the time.
The limitation on the congressional power granted by the Thirteenth Amendment 
in the Civil Rights Cases provided a basis to permit the separate but equal doctrine 
established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).27 The Court cites the proposition presented in 
the Civil Rights Cases as support that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment does not 
extend to exercise power over social relations.28 It reasons that Congress does not have 
the power nor does the Thirteenth Amendment contain the force to end racial prejudices 
or forbid distinctions based on physical appearance. Thus, laws enforcing separate but 
equal remained constitutional until the Court overruled the decision in Brown v. Board o f  
Education o f Topeka (1954), which determined that separate but equal was 
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.29 Such laws permitted
abolishes slavery), but by force of the Thirteenth and Fifteen Amendments.” Thus, a combination of the 
two in a claim maybe prevented sections one and two from being declared invalid.
26 Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment,” Columbia Law Review 
112, no. 7, (2012): 1464-1469.
27 See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This case is about a man that is prosecuted under 
a Louisiana statute because he refused to remove himself from a railroad car reserved for whites. The 
statute required that railroad companies provide difference cars for black persons and white person while 
providing separate but equal accommodations. Nurses accompanying children of other races was an 
exception to the segregated railroad cars.
28 Plessy, 542-43.
29 See generally Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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and reinforced Jim Crow, perpetuating the suffering of blacks at the hands of Southern 
whites.30
The subject of labor contracts fell within Thirteenth Amendment exceptions. One 
case in which the Court identified the inapplicability of the Thirteenth Amendment was 
Robertson v. Baldwin (1897). Four sailors had been working for a commercial liner, 
Arago, when they became discontent with their employment. They departed from a port 
in San Francisco, made a stop in Washington, at a port in Knappton, and continued to 
other ports. Somewhere along this tour, the sailors became dissatisfied with their 
employment and departed the ship in Astoria, Oregon.
There, they were arrested for desertion. They were tried and sentenced to 
imprisonment until the Arago was ready to depart again. Sixteen days later, when the 
Arago had been prepared for departure, a marshal escorted the sailors from jail back to 
the commercial liner. They refused to return to work but remained on board the ship.
They had made it to San Francisco, the place where they would be arrested and charged 
with refusal to work. They sued on a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed upon 
hearing by the California district court. The court also issued an order that remanded the 
sailors to return to the custody of the marshal who had escorted them. They petitioned to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.31
The Court noted that the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment is extended to public 
and private service; however, it stated that maritime service is an exception, created by a 
labor contract in which the sailor surrenders his personal liberty to serve on the high
j0 Walter F. Murphy et al., American Constitutional Interpretation, 3ld ed. (Foundation Press: New York, 
2003), 908.
31 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 275-77 (1897).
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seas.32 It reasoned that since the legislation punishing members who desert and are absent 
without leave had existed some 60 years before the constitutional adoption of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, it is doubtful that the amendment was drafted with the intent to 
apply to labor contracts. The Court ruled that maritime labor contracts do not fall within 
the scope of involuntary servitude/3 Thus, it affirmed the decision and had restricted the 
reach of the Thirteenth Amendment to labor contracts.
Labor contracts became subject to scrutiny when they did bring about a condition 
of peonage, which the Court correctly identified as involuntary servitude. Peonage, 
coerced or compulsive labor served to liquidate a debt, was outlawed yet it flourished in 
the Southern states.34 The first time it had come under legal scrutiny was in 1902. The 
Court established, in Clyatt v. United States (1905), the validity of the Peonage Abolition 
Act of 1867, holding positively that the Thirteenth Amendment did apply and that the Act 
was constitutional (this case will be discussed more in the chapter on peonage)/'’ The 
stark contrast, as legal scholar and attorney Cynthia A. Bailey notes, was the Court's 
interpretation of involuntary servitude in the Clyatt case. In Clyatt, the Court found that 
the nature of service was essential to determining involuntary servitude. The nature of 
the contract determined in Clyatt was contrary to the Court’s criteria for involuntary 
servitude in Robertson, which looked at the mode of origin. It would not be until the
j2 Robertson, 282.
”  Robertson, 287-88.
,4 Black’s Law’ Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “involuntary servitude5' defines the term as “The condition of one 
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor to another, whether he 
is paid or not.55 Thus, involuntary servitude includes chattel slavery, among other forms like peonage, and 
convict-leasing.
j5 See generally Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
36 Cynthia A. Bailey, “Workfare and Involuntary Servitude -  What You Wanted to Know but Were Afraid 
to Ask,” Boston College Third World Law Journal 15, no. 2 (1995): 319.
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surge of peonage cases that the Court would reassess its approach towards labor 
contracts.
Academic Understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment
Collegiate-level textbooks that inform the academic mind have followed the same 
notions as popular understanding. Darlene Clark Hine’s The African American Odyssey 
notes that the Amendment was ratified in 1865 and outlawed slavery. The American 
Promise, a history textbook, shares the same message -  the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolished slavery. 8 Harrison and Harris's American Democracy Now also notes that the 
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.39 Freedom On My Mind: A History o f African 
Americans, with Documents, also acknowledges the abolition of slavery throughout the 
United States.40
The discourse between members of the academic community engaging each other 
in scholarly discussion has focused more on the type of rights the Thirteenth Amendment 
establishes.41 In establishing the context through which they debate the meaning and
’7 Darlene Clark Hine, The African American Odyssey, 5th ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 2011), 312.
’8 James L. Roark, The American Promise: A History o f the American People, Volume II: From 1865 (New 
York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005), 567. Also, see table on p. 576.
Brigid Harrison, Jean Wahl Harris and Michelle D. Deardorff, American Democracy Now, 2nd ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 75, See note in side tab. The authors also note the Thirteenth Amendment to be 
the legal end to slavery on p. 99.
40 Deborah Gray White, Mia Bay, Waldo Martin, Jr., Freedom on My Mind: A History o f African 
Americans, with Documents (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013), 347.
41 In January 2012, a symposium, hosted by Columbia Law Review, explored doctrinal relationship of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to concepts of liberty and equality. A number of historians, political scientists and 
legal scholars participated in intellectual discourse to better understand the doctrinal relevance of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to such concepts and their relationship to contemporary issues. The participants 
include Jack Balkin, Sanford Levinson, Mark A. Graber, George Rutherglen, Alexander Tsesis, Jennifer 
Mason McAward, Rebecca Zietlow, Eric Foner, Aviam Soifer, Darrell A. H. Miller, William M. Carter, Jr., 
Richard Delgado and Andrew Koppelman.
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scope, they appeal to the historic nature and origin of the Thirteenth Amendment -  meant 
to address American chattel slavery. Slavery, however, becomes another topic of debate.
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson explore the “danger" (their use of quotations 
around the term indicate misapplication) associated with the Thirteenth Amendment.42 
They maintain that the Amendment’s restrictive interpretation is based on the possible 
threat it poses to political and market/commercial interests and practices if construed 
broadly. Balkin and Levinson finds an issue to be the contemporary connotation and 
association of the term slavery, which, according to them, is narrow in its content of 
historical practices and thus, anachronistic.43 They maintain that slavery meant something 
different in colonial America because it included in its definition the following: 1) 
illegitimate domination -  wrongly acquired position of agency over an individual; 2) 
political subordination -  lack of political equality (and political voice) between members 
of society; and 3) the absence of republican government -  lack of political representation. 
Chattel slavery, which shapes the contemporary notion of slavery, is a most extreme 
example of the slavery understood in colonial times.44 This distinction leads them to 
inquire about the interpretive nature of the Thirteenth Amendment, which has language 
adopted from the Northwest Ordinance (1787) that predates the Constitution. They 
suggest that if construed in the colonial context, there is a possibility that the 
Amendment’s prohibition may apply to a variety of social and civil ills. 45
42 Balkin and Levinson, 1470-1477.
43 See generally Balkin and Levinson, 1459-1499.
44 Ibid., 1482-1485.
45 Ibid., 1470-1471. Balkin and Levinson suggest that slavery was repugnant to the Founding Fathers’ ideal 
of republican government. They find that since the punishment exception clause was adopted from the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the meaning of slavery ought to have been adopted as well.
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This broad definition in application to the Thirteenth Amendment provides an 
array of activities that may be considered to be slavery. More importantly, it suggests that 
criminal conviction would forfeit the protection against slavery against more than the 
extreme conditions commonly associated with chattel slavery.46 This implicit notion is 
concurrent with Scott Howe’s originalist interpretation of the punishment exception 
clause. This type of interpretation focuses on reading the text within the context of the 
how the text was understood by the public when it was originally presented and published 
-  its historical context. Howe focuses on how, if using the originalist interpretation, the 
punishment exception clause permits slavery and involuntary servitude that would be 
otherwise prohibited by the remaining text of the Amendment. He notes the basis for 
reading the punishment exception clause in this manner: proponents of the antislavery 
measure did not specify a limited definition nor did Northwest Ordinance provide a 
specific definition.47 Howe observes an applicable rule to how the clause should be read 
in District o f Columbia v. Heller (2008) -  the clause must be interpreted by its original 
meaning among ordinary citizens of the time, which he finds permits slavery and 
involuntary servitude.48 Although Howe argues that the challenges of an originalist 
interpretation of the punishment exception clause cannot be overcome, in a convincing 
manner, his work alludes to the 38th Congress’s yield to a clause that enables both slavery 
and involuntary servitude to be modes of punishment for the government to utilize,
46 Ibid., 1475-1477, 1484.
47 Scott W. Howe, “Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and 
the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment,” Arizona Law Review 51 (Winter, 2009): 990-91.
48 Ibid., 990. The term this author uses, “punishment exception clause,” is synonymous with Howe’s 
“slavery-as-punishment” term. Both terms reference the same clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.
26
should it decide to do so. In effect, by the originalist interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, slavery nor involuntary servitude is completely abolished.
While Howe discusses the legislative history leading up to the passage and the 
ratification containing the punishment exception clause, Alvaro Hasini recaps a piece of 
legislative history post-ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Two years after the 
ratification of the Amendment, Representative John A. Kasson of Iowa introduced a 
resolution to the House to resolve the issue of the vagueness inherent in the punishment 
clause in response to an advertisement which contained in bold print the selling of 
negroes as punishment for a crime.49 The resolution sought to define the clause by 
limiting control of prisoners to the official capacity of the government and the class of 
servitude to be performed by convicts would be limited to imprisonment or servitude -  
the condition of involuntary servitude must directly correlate with the criminal conviction 
and punishment, if including hard labor in “the regular and ordinary course of law” in the 
sentence is extent to which such a punishment would be constitutional.50 The resolution 
passed the House; however, it failed to pass the Senate. Since the resolution failed in the 
Senate, the meaning of the clause remained unchanged/1 Hasini argues that prisoners are 
exempted from slavery and involuntary servitude that are not directly related to the prison 
sentence of the convicted. He applies this argument to the situation of prison sexual 
slavery -  ‘stronger’ inmates subjecting ‘weaker’ inmates to badges and incidents of 
slavery.
49 Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1867), 344-45.
50 Alvaro Hasini, “You Are Hereby Sentenced to a Term of... Enslavement?: Why Prisoners Cannot Be 




Pete Daniel’s The Shadow o f Slavery sheds light on peonage as it operated 
throughout the Progressive Era to the Civil Rights Era, where his study ends and peonage 
cases were no longer in focus.53 He begins with the story surrounding United States v. 
Clyatt (1905) -  a case that lasted for eight years (it was remanded and sent back to the 
lower courts for rehearing and the Justice Department held on to the prosecution until the 
one who brought the case requested it be dropped). Daniel discussed the trajectory, sure 
to note the success and failure of the case. The success was the validity of the Peonage 
Abolition Act of 1867 (PAA), yet Clyatt was acquitted on a technicality and prosecution 
had failed.^4
Daniel also discusses what constituted peonage, how it managed to operate 
though outlawed, the patterns it operated in and where, methods by which one was placed 
in peonage and who it affected. The primary targets were blacks, followed by 
immigrants. Peonage succeeded slavery as a system of bondage. Those sucked into the 
“vortex of peonage,” as Daniel calls it, suffered tremendously. Poor whites suffered from 
its effects on the labor economy as well. Daniel also discusses the social, economic, and 
political factors that impacted the South and cultivated peonage. Debt, imposed over and 
over again, replaced the legal status of slavery in that one was compelled to service. 
Between the Freedmen's Bureau, the U.S. Army (who lost the drive to protect freedmen 
after a while) and the lack of capital and land, peons became ensnared in a system of 
peonage. Contracts ensured the laborers employment, but they also risked entanglement
53
54
See generally Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery’. 
Ibid.
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into a system of neo-slavery and the ultimate price to be employed could carry serious 
consequences, as it often did.55
Throughout his work, Daniel recounts peonage cases, some of which revealed 
how employers and justices of peace would collaborate to keep peons in bondage. One of 
the cases conveys the lengths that some employers would go -  pretend to be an official 
court and have a peon (in the case he highlights, the peon was black) under the 
impression that his term of employment was extended by the court.56 Other methods that 
Daniel presents are practices used to compel a person to become a peon: falsely charge 
the employee and told him that the only mode of evasion was to sign a labor contract; 
judges issuing fines to poor persons knowing that they could not pay; and laws that 
infringed upon the laborer’s right to quit and work elsewhere without notifying the 
current employer.57
Daniel dedicates one chapter to tell the story about Alonzo Bailey and his journey 
before the Supreme Court twice, in 1908 and 1911, to free himself of the conditions of 
peonage.'8 Daniel also discusses how the South lured immigrants with advertisements of 
“the land where it never snows.”59 Northern labor agents played an active role in 
recruiting and transporting immigrant labor to the South, where the immigrant laborers 
would be promised quality working conditions; the reality when they arrived was far 
from what they were promised.60 Prosecution of peonage violators in the immigrant
35 Ibid., 19-42. Peonage spread across the South in three forms: cotton farms, turpentine farms and naval 






peonage cases were less successful than the cases of black peons, but immigrant peonage 
cases declined in 1910, which left peonage to the blacks.61
Peonage, as Daniel explains, was hard to root out. It was embedded in social 
custom and perceived as a social norm. Anyone who dared challenge it would be receive 
retaliation.62 Although the PAA abolished peonage, it flourished anyway. States passed 
labor-contract laws to protect the interest of the employers and disadvantaged the 
laborers. Employers would also sabotage prosecutions by making witnesses disappear or 
through acts of bribery. Moreover, the narrowness of the PAA presented prosecuting 
attorneys with a nearly impossible challenge. Although Bailey caused a period of 
cessation in peonage claim in Alabama, the claims reemerged, though most were 
dismissed on technicalities or lack of witnesses. By 1920, peonage seemed more visible, 
but there were fewer complaints, according to Daniel. ~ Nonetheless, peonage remained 
as strong as its predecessor, slavery; it was protected and nourished by local law 
enforcement, judicial officials and sympathetic juries and fortified by custom. It reigned 
supreme with little federal interference.66
Douglas A. Blackmon began his research under a separate, yet related inquiry -  in 
applying the lens of historical confrontation used to examined the benefits reaped by 
German corporations and Swiss banks from actions committed toward the victims of the 
Holocaust to American corporations, what would be revealed?67 His exploration led to 
him to findings that inextricably linked such corporations to the nation’s history of
61 Ibid., 106-7.
62 Ibid., 7-12, 147.
63 Ibid., 14, 108.





compulsory labor. Slavery by Another Name examines the multiple forms of involuntary 
slavery, which succeeded slavery. Blackmon does so by identifying the practices that 
were the same under slavery and the systems of involuntary servitude it bore post-Civil 
War. One such practice was the leasing of slaves as human capital and labor. This 
practice existed before the Civil War, carried through the Civil War and when slavery 
was abolished, it carried on under the moniker of convict-leasing, which often led to debt 
slavery, introduced through vagrancy and reinforced by the practices of peonage and 
criminal-surety. Among its participants were industrial actors, such as Tredegar Iron 
Works and Brierfield Iron Works.68
Although Blackmon’s story centers on forced laborer Green Cottinham, he 
discusses the history of slavery and its impact on Cottinham. Moreover, he provides an 
account of slavery -  plantation and industrial -  and the transition of its badges, incidents, 
vestiges and relics, deeply woven into the social fabric of the South post-Civil War that 
emerged into the various forms of involuntary servitude. Clothed in custom, supported by 
rationalizations and economic dependence, protected by legal structures and violent acts 
of Southern whites, forced labor had lived long after the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
abolition. He references the punishment exception clause and briefly discusses its 
implications on this system.69
Blackmon discusses the similarities between slavery and the convict-leasing 
system and prison conditions of convicts that were leased. He identifies former slave 
masters that became heavily involved with and greatly influenced the judicial 
administrative system. Former slave masters would become justices of peace as well as
68 Ibid., 15-21.
69 Ibid., 53. Blackmon makes a clear reference to the punishment exception.
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store owners and persons with commercial interests in the developing industrial complex, 
which depended on raw materials mined, which in turned depended on cheap labor 
inevitably provided by those convicted of crimes.70
Like slaves, convicts could be leased out. Debts operated as tradable units -  they 
could be sold at a full or discounted price or swapped. Sheriffs operated as slave masters 
would, exercising authority over the leasing of convicts. Judges, not paid by the county, 
received their wages by assessing court fees. Fees also paid law enforcement officers, 
certain court officials and witness that testified. Often, black offenders, possessing little 
money and property, could not pay. Summary proceedings took precedence over trials as 
each official act exercised by sheriffs, court official and judges were combined with fines 
and penalties ordered by the judge. They were either sent to prison and leased out or a 
person would act as surety, taking responsibility for the financial obligation and ensuring 
good behavior of the convicted.71 In a system rested upon summary proceedings, records 
were ill-maintained. It was not uncommon for a convict (or an alleged convict) to have no
72record as a convict, though laboring as one.
Mine and prison camps contained horrid conditions. Convicts were flogged for 
resisting orders, whipped, and received water torture when whippings or floggings were 
deemed ineffective; much of these punishments were performed while the convicts were
70 Ibid., 63-78.
7' Ibid., 61-6.
2 Ibid., 76, 109. Reginald Dawson, chief prison inspector of Alabama in 1883, discovered a number of 
convict laborers held by at the Newcastle and Coalburg prison mines that had not been paid for nor listed 
on prison rosters that were required to be maintained by law (p. 76). Thomas Parke, a health officer in 
Jefferson County of Alabama, visited another Coalburg mine and noted that the records of at least 500 
convict laborers did not exist in the official state records (p. 109).
73 Ibid., 373.
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under restraint.74 Scant clothing, poorly maintained sleeping quarters, little or no medical 
attention and treatment, and meager rations were provided to the convict laborers. The 
lack of adequate needs to be provided by the employer in exchange for labor prompted 
the untimely expiration of the laborers -  their value less than that of slaves as they could 
be replaced cheaply and the criminal system ensured adequate supply.73
Often, those running the farms, mines and prison camps falsely proclaimed that 
the convict laborers were cared for and well-maintained; furthermore, they fired back 
with statements that blamed the black convict laborers for their own maltreatment and 
demise.76 Such claims were contended by government and medical officials appalled by 
what they had witnesses; however, such claims had little bearing on convict-labor 
conditions.77 Most significantly, and implicitly, Blackmon argued convict-leasing as a 
form of peonage sanctioned by the state and its government officials through criminal
74 Ibid., 71.
7? Ibid., 75-8, 96, 108-10,135. Dawson began inspection visits to state prisons. The legislature engaged in 
this investigation to preserve the practice of convict-leasing rather than out of concern for the treatment of 
the convicts. Throughout these inspections, Dawson witnessed deplorable acts of inhumane treatment and 
no effective change upon return visits. In response, he made recommendations to revamp the convict­
leasing program, but such implored recommendations went largely ignored (pp. 75-8).
Blackmon states, “slaves of the earlier era were at least minimally insulated physical harm by their intrinsic 
value. Their owners could borrow money with slaves as collateral, pay debts with them, sell them at a 
profit, or extend the investment through production or more slave children. But the convicts of the new 
system were of value only as long as their sentences or physical strength lasted. If they died while in 
custody, there was no financial penalty to the company leasing them. Another black laborer would always 
be available from the state or a sheriff. There was no compelling reason no to tax these convicts to their 
actual physiological limits” (p. 96).
Their owner Parke observed the primitive sleeping quarters of the convict laborers, onerous work days and 
lack of medical care afforded to the convict laborers. He also found a large number of the laborers died due 
to the overall conditions. The greatest effect of the criticism was embarrassment of those leasing convicts
(p. 108-10).
A medical inspector reported to the Board of Inspectors of Convicts, the same agency of which Dawson 
was chief inspector, that he found a man to have died of frostbite to his feet, which lacked protection (socks 
and shoes; some had the little protection of was wrapped around their feet) from the cold (p. 135).
76 Ibid., 109.
77 Ibid., 75-8, 108-10,135
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prosecution and conviction; involuntary servitude was initiated through the nexus of
78minor offenses to vagrancy laws and other criminal statutes.
Darrell A. H. Miller explores the concept of custom and its relevance to the 
meaning and scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. Custom, he explains, has contextual 
meaning and has existed in various forms in the American nation. He states custom as a 
source of law before the generation of positive law, suggesting instances and 
circumstances in which private actions were predicated on customary law rather than 
positive law, such as right to abortion, bear arms and sovereign immunity of states from 
its citizens. He also discusses other contexts in which custom exists: cultural, social and 
behavioral norms, and as a legal source of common and legislated law. Customs, in 
these contexts, influenced and continues to influence laws and jurisprudence without 
having to be memorialized in texts.
Custom, he maintains, helped to support and reinforce slavery. The cultural 
implications of internalized customs, as well as external social customs, placed free 
blacks in danger of experiencing the conditions of chattel slavery. Custom provided the 
foundation for laws, and often materialized into legislative enactments, to protect slave- 
owner interests; and sometimes, it functioned, when integrated into statutes, to restricts 
customary practices (i.e. legal mandates of manumission to slaves that converted to
O ')
Christianity). The practice of racial solidarity among whites, although working and not 
part of the slave-owning class, to discriminate against blacks operated within the context
78 See generally Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name.
79 Ibid., 1814-1815.
80 Ibid.




of custom, as did keeping slaves in compliance (and not revolt) and ensuring that blacks 
did not disrupt or incite disruptions.84 According to Miller, custom had three implications 
on the American legal institution. It provided justifications to treat humans as property, 
legitimized morally abhorrent slavery, and influenced resistance to legal abolition of 
slavery were predicated on social, cultural and behavioral norms. '
Southern Resistance
Hasini, Daniel, Blackmon and Miller each hint on Southern resistance to federal 
laws, and the flawed construction of the Thirteenth Amendment and synchronicity of the 
punishment exception clause with its then-current legal practice. Representative Kassan 
had seen an advertisement that sought to utilize the punishment exception clause to suit 
commercial interests and reinforce white supremacy, supported by rationalized 
ideological structures that whites were to be respected and feared by whites that had long 
pervaded the antebellum slavery period. This observation promoted a reaction on his 
behalf to introduce a joint resolution to define, and thereby restrict, the police power to be 
exercised by state governments that may seek to oppress and marginalized the 
disadvantaged blacks that were recently emancipated. As Hasini explains, the resolution 
saw a cease to its momentum in the Senate where it was stopped indefinitely.
Stephen Kantrowitz notes in Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction o f White 
Supremacy that the resistance to Reconstruction in the South was underway before the
84 Ibid., 1832.
85 Ibid., 1834.
86 Congressional Globe, 39lh Cong., 2nd Sess. (1867), 345. The clerk of the House reads the advertisement,




Radical Republicans had begun their reconstruction. Benjamin Tillman, renowned 
racist and white supremacist Southern politician, led an activist agenda to nullify federal 
power and implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment and the legislation that passed 
from it. One Southern delegate rationalized and justified Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 
intimidation, stating that the KKK was acting as a vigilante group intent upon punishing 
the black criminal that the Republican authorities would not. 90 Punishment for crime was 
Governor Tillman’s message to South Carolinian white men. He deplored lynching, 
which was often carried out as entertainment or for imagined socio-legal violations of 
racial respect. Punishment for a crime was to replace outright murders. Lynching reduced 
the number of black laborers available to agricultural employers, like Tillman, and drove 
up the price of labor.91
Miller’s examination of custom is a pertinent subject to exploring conduct that 
undermines the power and reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. It is what is invoked by 
Daniel and Blackmon as a protective force of systems of involuntary servitude. Daniel 
and Blackmon challenged the established view of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection 
by exposing systems of involuntary servitude that operated under the protection state 
criminal laws as well as custom. Blackmon even makes mention of the punishment 
exception as the one apparatus in which slavery and involuntary could continue to exist. 
The very construction of the Amendment permits slavery and involuntary servitude so
88 Stephen Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction o f White Supremacy (The University of North 
Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000), Kindle Edition, Location I 132 of 10238.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 1253-1254 of 10238.
91 Ibid., 3463 of 10238.
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long as it is punishment for a crime upon one who has been duly convicted. States 
exercise police powers to convict those within its bounds of crimes.
Coupled with custom, the Southern States undermined the Thirteenth Amendment 
and clung to systems of bondage to preserved their beloved social hierarchy. Thus, 
peonage, abolished by the PAA, remained alive and thriving in Southern states, protected 
by state laws;92 and vagrancy laws, often invoked as states’ police power to regulate 
criminal activity, remained untouched by the Court until 1972. The systems persisted 
and the federal government, by error of legislative construction and design, was limited 
in its power to end it. The South saw it and took advantage of the opportunity inherent in 
the punishment exception clause.
Chapter 2: Vagrancy
It is a widely held historical fact that the Jim Crow era was one in which nearly 
every aspect of black life was criminalized in the U.S. Crimes for disrespect of white 
women, adultery -  which was disparagingly applied towards black men, carrying a 
weapon, taking work elsewhere without a written document of employment termination 
by previous employer, failure to obtain a labor contract by a state-mandated deadline and 
vagrancy, which was defined so equivocally that an offender can be in violation for 
nearly anything.94 Vagrancy was the easiest tool of the state in gathering criminals. Once 
gathered and convicted, the court could lease them out.
92 See generally Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery.
9' Papachristou v. City o f Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
94 Blackmon, 53-4.
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Often when people think of crimes, they think of robbery, arson, murder, treason, 
etc.; however, vagrancy is not a crime that comes to the forefront when considering 
criminal conduct. Why is that? As Forrest W. Lacey states, “vagrancy is the principle 
crime in which the offense consists of being a certain kind of person rather than having 
done or failed to do certain acts.”9̂  Often crime is associated with action or inaction; 
however, the association is linked to one class of crime. Vagrancy is in the class of crime 
that identifies with personal condition rather than action or inaction.
Crimes of personal condition are a peculiar class of legal violations that have been 
grandfathered into the U.S. legal and criminal justice system from the English legal and 
criminal justice system.96 It appears to have been necessary as England attempted to 
deport vagrants to Virginia.97 Aware of vagrancy in England, it is possible that Virginia 
adopted such laws for similar reasons, to regulate movement of the unemployed and 
those that did not own land, provide a sufficient pool of cheap laborers and prevent
95 Forrest W. Lacey, “Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition,” Harvard Law Review 66, no. 7 
(1953): 1203.
96 See Lacey, 1206. Lacey states, “vagrancy legislation in the United States which began in colonial times, 
closely follows English models.” See also Arthur H. Sherry, “Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds - Old 
Concepts in Need of Revision,” California Law Review 48, no. 4 (1960): 557-58. Sherry traces vagrancy 
back to terminology, vagrom men, used in William Shakespeare’s Much Ado about Nothing reflecting the 
presence of vagrancy in 14th-century England. The term is a classifying nomenclature of men had a 
personal condition that was considered immorally criminal. Sherry identifies the notion behind English 
vagrancy law that transitioned into American vagrancy law, which is a person whose rights are guaranteed, 
or supposed to be guaranteed, by the government is still subject to criminal punishment “by virtue of 
personal condition or of belonging to a particular class.” See also Robin Yeamans, “Constitutional Attacks 
on Vagrancy Laws,” Stanford Law Review> 20, no. 4 (1968): 782. Yeamans also traces the origins of 
vagrancy to 14th-century England, not by review of theatrical manuscripts, but by identification of the law, 
the first Statute of Labourers, which, as she suggests, limited the movement of the unemployed and those 
who did not own land for purposes of fortifying the English feudal structure and securing a sufficient pool 
of laborers that would work for cheap following the Black Plague. See also C.J. Ribton-Turner, A History 
o f Vagrants and Vagrancy and Beggars and Begging (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith Publishing Co., 
1972), 3. Ribton-Turner assumes from inference regarding the “axioms of law” that vagrancy existed as 
early as the Anglo-Saxon rule over the Isles, currently known as the U.K., premised upon why laws are 
created - not in anticipation for wrongs that have a possibility or probability of occurring, but as a remedy 
for wrongs that are already existent.
97 Ribton-Turner, 141.
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crime.98 A Virginia court, in 1937, defended the state’s vagrancy statutes. Its defense 
makes one wonder: how is it that vagrancy laws fit into a system that is supposed to 
permit one pursue life, liberty, and property, which may be deprived with due process of 
law?
History of Vagrancy Laws
The origins of vagrancy laws are oriented in fourteenth-century England. Legal 
scholars and historians identify the first written record as the first Statute of Labourers.99 
In 1348, Black Death, which originated in the East and stormed all of Europe, appeared 
in England. The aftermath included a labor shortage as the population had been 
devastated. Another effect of the Black Death aftermath was a shift in labor economics; 
laborers charged high wages for their labor as they emerged with labor economics in their 
favor. With prices for their services high and the supply of laborers numerous, laborers 
became idle. Their idleness gave rise to other issues.100
The Black Death aftermath and laborers’ idleness created an uneasy atmosphere 
for landowners and employers; it created economic and social disorder. Thus, Parliament 
found it necessary to enact a legal tool -  vagrancy -  to help regulate the economic issues 
of labor supply and wage compensation for labor, as well as socially unacceptable 
behavior of the laborers.101 The tool was the Statute of Laborers, which provided in detail 
what is expected of laborers and a mechanism for labor control, which provided support
98 Sherry, 1206; Yeamans, 782.
99 Emphasis added to “first” as there are subsequent statutes under the same title. See footnote 96.
100 Ribton-Tumer, 42-4. The author does not specify what the other disorders are (this author references 
those disorders as issues); however, this author believes it to be criminal activity - i.e. prostitution, theft, 
loitering, begging, etc. - as the following section of the author’s narrative quotes the Statute o f Laborers, 
which discusses the other issues further.
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for the feudal-type system that had been in place. “ The ordinance, which later came to
be held as statute by authority of 2 Rich. II, Stat. 1, c. 8 (1378) was the tool enacted by
Parliament; its preamble reads as follows;
Because a great part of the people, and especially of workmen and servants, late 
died of the pestilence, many seeing the necessity of masters and great scarcity of 
servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive wages, and some rather
• • • • 1 AOwilling to beg in idleness than by labour to get their living...
The preamble was a direct response to the social and economic phenomenon that
England had been experiencing. It was drafted with the purpose of addressing the
economic turmoil that emerged from laborers who sought higher wages for their work
and contributed to the surplus of unemployed laborers. The preamble continued on to
declare that every able-bodied individual within England, up to the age of sixty that was
not a merchant, did not have a craft (i.e. masonry, smithing, etc.), live on his own land, or
right to his own land where he may live and not in service to a master already, be bound
to serve if he or she was required to serve. Should a person not have completed his or her
time of service under the terms of the agreement, he (or she) would be imprisoned.104 The
preamble, which became law in 1378 as mentioned above, had, in effect, sought to ensure
laborers were 'contributing their part' to the labor economic system. The law was meant
to reinforce the socioeconomic status and position of the aristocracy, landowners, and
masters, and to keep the laborers in a position to labor only. Furthermore, it created a
degree of involuntary servitude that was punishable by law - imprisonment for failure to
complete service under contracted terms, or more simply, a breach of contract.
102 Ribton-Turner, 43; See also Sherry, 558.
103 2 Rich. Stat. 1, c. 8 quoted in Ribton-Turner, 43.
104 Ibid., 43-4. This author finds a similarity, if not a predisposition in the law, to peonage support by 
breach of contract, which also seeps into the American legal system. See also University of Missouri, St. 
Louis, Statute o f Labourers, 135 f  http://www.umsl.edu/~gradyf/medieval/statute.htm (accessed Dec. 11, 
2015).
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Vagrancy laws were designed as a legal tool of social behavioral and economic 
control. English vagrancy laws had three functions: control the labor market, add to and 
support poor relief laws, and prevent incidents of criminal activity.105 As English 
colonists began to settle in the New World, they carried with them vagrancy laws, among 
other badges and relics of English life. The element of idleness found in the English 
Statute of Labourers is found in American vagrancy statutes.106 The commonality 
between the two suggests an importation of vagrancy laws from the English legal system 
into the American legal system. Sherry notes, however, an essential difference in the 
English Vagrancy Act of 1824 and American vagrancy law - the English Vagrancy Act of 
1824 virtually limited its emphasis to conduct and did not focus on attaching criminality 
to a person based solely on his or her status. This distinction would begin to appear in 
the U.S. court jurisprudence and interpretation of the scope of vagrancy laws in the mid­
twentieth century.
Social Theories of Vagrancy Law
Vagrancy law may be considered a legal tool to aid and regulate labor supply and 
enhance social control ability. There are two basic theories of crime that David Bright 
considers when he begins his analysis of vagrancy in Calgary, Canada. The first theory 
that he presents and discusses is the functionalist theory of crime. The functionalist 
theory contends that laws are not merely reflections of the interests of individuals and 
groups that exist in a society, but transcends them and reflects the aggregate moral 





other sociologists, provide the foundation for this theory. The perspective of this theory 
suggests that those who performed criminal acts did so as a result of insufficient 
internalization of social norms and values. When the question of the relevance of the 
functionalist theory to social control emerges, the response is that social control is vested 
into the criminal justice system to remedy poor internalization of accepted social values 
within a respective society.108
The second theory that he presents is the conflict theory of crime. The conflict 
theory purports that laws and legal institutions function at the behest of those that are 
dominant in society and the principal concern is preserving the system. The framework of 
this theory provides that a criminal was one who acted contrary to the interests of the 
dominant members of a respective society and was thus under subjection to that force of 
its legal system. This theory gained much support and momentum from the works of Karl 
Marx. Regarding the question of social control, the conflict theory does not place primary 
importance on the internalization of values but contends that social control is vested in 
the enforcers and administrators of law to accommodate the interests of the dominant 
class by suppressing those who performed the actions that are contrary to such 
interests.109 The functionalist theory emphasizes the legal system as a form of social 
correction; the conflict theory emphasizes the actors performing within the system to 
accommodate interests of the dominant class, highlighting the influence o f political 
motivations upon criminal law implementation.
108 David Bright, “Loafers Are Not Going to Subsist Upon Public Credulence: Vagrancy and the Law in 
Calgary, 1900-1914,“ Laboar/Le Travail 36 (1995): 40-1.
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Bright also presents a more refined version of the conflict model theory, which 
emerges from the results of recognizing the rising bourgeoisie class in England. E.P. 
Thompson, Douglas Hay, and other scholars refined the conflict model when they 
observed the criminal justice procedure on the role of the bourgeoisie in the process. 
Thompson and Hay identified the capacity of the law to make a ruling class’s exercise of 
power - obtained from the nature of social and economic relations - legitimate. The 
refined theory suggests that the essential feature in the function of law is its capacity 
rather than it a coercive design and function. Thompson and Hay reason that the law 
functions adequately when both the ruled and rulers abide by it, which provides the 
function of law with an essence of justice and fairness, imbuing a degree of absolutism in 
that it does not apply only to certain members of society.110
Which theory is applicable to vagrancy law during the Jim Crow Era in the United 
States? While it is idealistic and typical to suggest the extended version of the conflict 
theory model, history suggests that the original model is more applicable to the situation. 
Further exploration of the mechanics and operative use of vagrancy laws during the Jim 
Crow era throughout the remainder of this chapter will reveal why the Marxian conflict 
theory model is most applicable.
Mississippi’s Vagrancy Laws
In 1857, Mississippi submitted to Congress its state laws. Within its statutes were 
its criminal statutes, which included vagrancy, some acts that constituted public 
indecency were included in the vagrancy provisions, and other acts were covered in
110Ibid., 42.
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separate provisions. Article (Art.) 344 provides a statutory definition of vagrancy.
Vagrants were defined as:
All able bodied persons who live without employment or labor have no visible 
means of support or maintenance; Any person who shall abandon his wife or 
family without just leaving them without support and in danger of becoming a 
charge; Keepers of houses of public gaming or houses of prostitution and 
common prostitutes who have no other employment for their support or 
maintenance; Any able bodied person who shall be found begging for a 





no visible means of employment and person is 
seen to be able-bodied
Vagrant
deserted family or spouse without a means of 
support
Vagrant
Running brothel or gambling house Vagrant
able-bodied and begging Vagrant
Person whose occupation is gambling; gambler Vagrant
The statutory language is consistent with that of the English vagrancy laws. A series of 
conditions could subject a person to vagrancy offenses.
Art. 345 orders judges to administer vagrancy provisions and issue warrants. 
When an officer brings up an offender on vagrancy charges, the judge is to examine the
111 Adapted from 64 Laws of Mississippi §69, art. 344.
112 64 Laws o f Mississippi §69, art. 344. The livelihood by gambling is also considered a vagrancy offense 
under art. 338.
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facts to find evidence of vagrancy. If the offender is found guilty of vagrancy, he is to 
pay a bond $200 and behave in a manner so as to not violate the law again. If the term of 
good behavior is successfully completed, the bond is returned within a year; if not 
proceedings will be reinstated and the bond will be forfeited. If unable to pay, the 
offender is sentenced to prison for ten days. A second offense carries 20 days of 
imprisonment without the option of a bond.114 The offender is also to be ordered by the 
judge to pay court fees and imprisonment costs associated with his, or her, trial and 
conviction.11:1 Considering that a majority of the African-descended population consisted 
of chattel slaves,116 this law focus more on the class stratification.
Mississippi continues to have statues for vagrancy. Its codes defined vagrants, and 
tramps, under which able-bodied beggars are classified. Offenses to the statutes are 
minor; nonetheless, they still exist. Until they statutes are subject to constitutional testing 
before the courts or its legislature repeals the laws, they will remain in effect. 
Mississippi’s Revision of Vagrancy Laws in its Black Codes
Between the period Mississippi’s vagrancy laws passed in 1857 and the laws that 
are currently effective as of 2015, Mississippi passed a special set of vagrancy laws to 
which targeted blacks. This special set of vagrancy laws were part of Mississippi's Black
113 64 Laws o f Mississippi §69, art. 345.
114 64 Laws o f Mississippi §69, art. 347.
"■ Demoral Davis, “A Contested Presence: Free Blacks in Antebellum Mississippi, 1820-1860,” 
Mississippi History Now (August 2009) http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/45/a-contested- 
presence-free-blacks-in-antebellum-mississippi-18201860 (accessed December 21, 2015). Davis states, 
“Blacks in Mississippi, and elsewhere in the South, became free in several ways. Prior to 1825, it was 
common and legal for slaves to become free either by purchasing their freedom or by slaveholders freeing 
them. Beginning in the mid-1820s, both forms of emancipation became increasingly less common and even 
illegal. The primary pathways to free status for blacks were blocked... The consistently small number of 
free blacks in Mississippi between 1810 and 1860 was a direct result of a network of controls, backed by 
laws and race prejudice.”
116 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-29.
117 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-37.
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Codes. These laws of the black codes were amended from the vagrancy laws of 1857.
The laws did not solely focus on blacks, as they had included whites, but they did target 
blacks.
The first section of the act expands the definition that was provided in the 1857 
provision for vagrancy:
All rogues and vagabonds, idle and dissipated persons... jugglers... persons
practicing unlawful plays, runaways, common drunkards, common night-walkers,
pilferers, lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior, common
railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employment, misspend1 1 &what they earn... all who neglect all lawful business...
The first section made nearly any aspect o f 4immoral' life a crime. Even what was
perceived as social disrespect toward white women was punitive under the black codes.
The second section declared all blacks, between the ages of 18 and 60, to be 
vagrants if they were able-bodied and without labor or employment and unlawfully 
assembled no matter the time of day; it declared whites to be vagrants if they were 
engaging in social relations with blacks as equals to include sexual relations with black 
women. The fines for blacks could not exceed $150 and for whites, $200; imprisonment 
for blacks was not to exceed ten days and for whites, six months. The punishments 
imposed were at the discretion of the court.11
The third section vested jurisdiction to hear matters concerning vagrancy to the 
court officials and mayors, and it charged law enforcement with the duty of enforcing 
vagrancy laws. Should law enforcement officials choose not to enforce the vagrancy
118 “An Ex-Slave Remembers: Mississippi Black Codes,” George Mason University, adapted from from a 
document placed online by Jud Sage at Northern Virginia Community College; See Laws o f the State o f 
Mississippi, Passed at a Regular Session o f the Mississippi Legislature, held in Jackson, October, 
November and December, 1965, Jackson, 1866, pp. 82-93, 165-167, 
https://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/122/recon/code.html (accessed December 21, 2015).
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laws, they could be subject to a fine up to $100.120 The fourth section reinforced Article 
344 of the Vagrancy Laws of 1857. The fifth section subjected blacks to being hired out 
if they could not pay their fines by the fifth day following the imposition of the fines. 
Preference was given to the employer; blacks were hired out to the amount that was paid 
off and the law permitted the employer to deduct from paid wages the amount to be paid 
for imposed costs. If blacks could not be hired out, they were to be treated like 
paupers.121
The sixth section permitted a tax to be levied against blacks to support a fund for 
those considered to be poor blacks or mulattos. The seventh section declared that those 
who failed or refused to pay as vagrants and failure or refusal to pay should function as 
prima facie evidence of a vagrancy offense and subjected blacks to be hired out as stated 
in the fifth section. The eighth section provided a right to appeal; fees assessed to appeal 
were established not to be less than $25 or more than $150.122
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protect himself from a vagrancy 
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Freedman’s Bureau to carry this 
document on him at all times 
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aimed at ensuring the demarcation of
the social status of blacks and whites remained. As evidenced above, restrictions were 
heavily placed upon blacks to work, not be outside in any type of association that could
be identified as illegal regardless of time of day, pay taxes or be hired out, and ensure that 
they could not be identified as vagrants. The statutory definition was so broad that it 
would be virtually impossible not to fall into the category. Moreover, the economic 
hardship that blacks faced after the Civil War was exacerbated by these cumbersome 
laws, which demanded much of them economically - provide support for family, do not 
engage in illegal economic or commercial activity, pay taxes to assist poor blacks and 
mulattos, and if prosecuted on vagrancy charges pay or be hired out to an employer. The 
social function of Mississippi’s Black Codes had not been to rehabilitate, but to exert
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control over blacks and marginal social control of whites. Whites, so long as they did not 
violate the status quo set by the laws - a reinforcement of socioeconomic relations from 
pre-Civil War Mississippi - they were not subject to the harshness of the vagrancy laws. 
The body of vagrancy laws carried a brutal legal force that descended upon on blacks, 
reinforced by its punitive justice system. Equality - social, political, economic - of blacks 
and whites was an interest that ran counter to that of the dominant class and political 
order.
Enforcement and Support of Vagrancy Laws
Vagrancy law, in its most principal purpose, was a body of law that was enforced 
and administered by police. Vagrancy statutes gave police a great deal of authority - 
profiling, demand of account of oneself, swift arrest if account is not satisfactory or 
adequate in officer’s judgment. Vagrancy suspects were often to subject to summary 
proceedings and judgment, meaning they were denied an indictment proceeding and a 
jury proceeding. " In the U.S., vagrancy statutory classifications varied from state to 
state but often included: able-bodied beggars; common thieves; fences or those that 
receive an income from black market (illegal market) activity; moral dissenters (i.e. 
prostitutes, gamblers, alcoholics, bootleggers); and common-law vagrants, which meant
123 See Yeamans, 788-89, 791. See also Bright, 48-9. See Lacey, 1203, 1210-11. See also Caleb Foote, 
“Vagrancy Law-Type and Its Administration,” University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 104, no. 5 (1956): 
614.
124 Foote, 608-9. See also Bright, 54-5. Bright shares a story of an American businessman visiting in 
Canada. In the midst of back and forth traveling to his hotel room and the coffee shop where he had a cup 
of coffee with his friend, he was stopped by two policemen. Despite sharing with the officers the details of 
his business trip, he was arrested. He spent twenty-four hours in jail. The magistrate dismissed the vagrancy 
charge, but that did not satisfy the businessman; he returned to the United States and commissioned a 
lawyer to petition the Secretary of State of Ottawa to formally prosecute the officers and compensate him 
for their mistreatment of him.
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those who became suspects and were stripped of the ability to provide a good account of
1 c
himself if found idle, begging or wandering.
It was very likely a person could be arrested for possibly committing a crime, 
without proof or evidence, through a vagrancy charge. " When brought before the court, 
the vagrancy law would operate as a last-resort prosecution, should the alleged criminal
• • 1 7 7prosecution be dismissed. ~ There have also been historical incidents in which having
association with a vagrant or a person suspected of committing a vagrancy offense was
admitted as evidence, aiding in prosecution. " Often, record or testimony of past
conduct that supports the condition of vagrancy was often used as evidence in cases
against vagrancy suspects; it is worthy to note some courts deemed the evidence of past
conduct as inadmissible. ~ The broad, sweeping statutory language virtually made many
actions an offense should the officers deem it so and the judges sustain their judgment.
Some courts supported and upheld vagrancy statutes, despite their broad
language. The New Jersey Court of Appeals maintained that:
states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in 
creating and defining criminal offenses, and a statute of this character does not 
violate the due process provision of the federal constitution, nor deny the violators 
of the statute the equal protection of the laws, where it operates without 
discrimination on all persons, and classes of persons, similarly situated; nor does
1 O A
it violate the provisions of the state constitution, 
and contended that “to challenge the power of the state to prevent the commission of such
crimes by legislation of this character, is to challenge its power to denounce and punish
125 Sherry, 558-61. Lacey, 1207.
126 See generally William O. Douglas, “Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion,” The Yale Law Journal 70, no.
1 (I960): 1-14.
127 Lacey, 1218-1219.
I2<s Ibid, 1214. Lacey asserts that there are several cases in Alabama in which a suspect could be prosecuted 
of a vagrancy offense by association to one the court deems to be dissolute or of disreputable character.
129 Ibid., 1213-1214.
130 Levine v. State, 1 10 N.J.L. 467 (1933).
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the crime itself.” 131 The court defended the sovereignty of the state rather than the rights 
of the people; it had opted not to perform an analysis to see if the vagrancy statute 
violated any fundamental rights.
Vagrancy is Constitutional?
Vagrancy has been supported and gone uncontested for much of its life in the
United States. Constitutional attacks toward vagrancy laws have stated violations of
fundamental and constitutional rights as well as constitutional protections afforded to the
people by the amendments. Challenges have been on the basis of the right to travel, the
immunities and privileges' clause of the Constitution, the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
protection against self-incrimination, involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth
Amendment, excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment and necessity of a
warrant under the Search and Seizures' clause of the Fourth Amendment. " The U.S.
Supreme Court began establishing principle that chiseled away at the effectiveness of
vagrancy law enforcement and prosecution. In Griffin v. Illinois (1956), the Court stated:
In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal 
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious 
discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. Both equal 
protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system 
— all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an 
equality before the bar of justice in every American court'... a State can no more 
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.
The Court also addressed the constitutional infringement by vagrancy statutes that
restricted travel. In Edwards v. California (1941), the Court holds that restriction of travel
131 Levine, 470-71.
K’2 See generally Yeamans, 782-93.
133 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
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violates the commerce clause, an enumerated constitutional power belonging to 
Congress. In United States v. Guest (1966), the Court maintained that the right to travel 
is recognized as a constitutional right.13? Therefore, wandering or roaming could no 
longer be considered a crime because the person is traveling, in a sense. Not once, but 
twice, the Court declared traveling to be a fundamental constitutional right; state criminal 
statutes that infringed upon it were, therefore, unconstitutional. Congress was held as the 
only governmental body that could address traveling via the commerce clause.
The Court held in Garrity v. New Jersey (1967) that testimonies received under 
coercion are inadmissible as it infringes on testimony rights granted in the Fifth 
Amendment; The principle in the above case was extended from Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) in which the Court maintained that an interrogation without notification of one’s 
rights and the option to have an attorney present was unconstitutional.137 The rendering in 
both cases struck at the policing practice of vagrancy that asked 'idling’ suspects to give 
good account.
The Court has also attacked the vagueness of vagrancy statutes, pinpointing broad 
language or the usage of very general words without providing a statutory definition. 
Ambiguity in a statute renders unawareness of an offense prior to being charged with the 
offense, which means nearly any activity could be subject to criminal prosecution. The 
courts have sought to remedy this by attempting to provide clarity or declaring statutes
134 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1941).
135 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-78 (1966).
136 See generally Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
1.7 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1.8 Yeamans, 791.
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139unconstitutional for such ambiguity. The Court found in United States v. Margeson 
(1966) that proof must be provided that a person could not give good account,140 thereby 
producing a restraint on the broad power that police and courts had in the prosecution of 
vagrancy suspects -  another strike by the Court at the exercise of state police powers in 
enforcing vagrancy laws.
Personal condition rather than conduct as an element of the criminal offense of
vagrancy was challenged and found to be unconstitutional in Fenster v. Leary (1967).141
The New York Court of Appeals declared:
This view of the matter does, of course, raise the possibility of interesting 
Thirteenth Amendment problems, and plaintiff strenuously urges these as grounds 
for reversal, and it also raises an interesting 'equal protection' question as to 
whether persons of means are entitled any more than the poor to enjoy the 
allegedly debilitating effects of idleness, but on a more fundamental level, we feel 
the statute is defective on the ground that, whatever purpose and role it may or 
may not have served in an earlier day, and however valid or invalid may be the 
proposition that the able-bodied unemployed poor are a likely source of crime...
If it is only to allow arrests and criminal prosecutions for vagrancy to continue 
against individuals such as these that the Attorney-General would have us uphold 
the statute, then it must fall. And despite certain fairly recent cases upholding 
similar statutes, we can, in fact, see no other purpose in our statute today and, 
therefore, find it invalid.142
The court based its decision its view of the operation of the vagrancy statute. It found that 
the purpose of the operation was outmoded and no longer justified in practice and thus, 
declared the statute invalid. It considered that the statute might infringe upon protections 
afforded to citizens by the Thirteenth Amendment by seeking to coerce them to seek 
work. Furthermore, the court considered the ambiguity in defining the offense, which 
subjects the offender to disparate treatment under the color of the law.
144 Ibid., 790-91.
140 United States v. Margeson, 259 F.Supp. 256, 270-71 (1966).
141 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309 (1967)
142 Ibid., 315-17.
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In Papachristou v. City o f Jacksonville (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court rendered 
the city's vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional. It reasoned that the classifications within 
the ordinance were outmoded, making acts that were contemporarily seen as “normally 
innocent” criminal. It also contended the ambiguity of the ordinance made it void.14 ’ The 
declaration functioned to limit police power that the Court viewed as unrestrained and 
implicitly, abused. The rule of invalidating a law for vagueness was followed again in 
City o f Chicago v. Morales (1999);144 however, the plurality opinion suggests laxation 
from the Court on other principles, which it was once stringent upon.
Mississippi’s Black Codes and the Thirteenth Amendment
The Black Codes of Mississippi operated outside of the scope of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. It was enacted before the Amendment was passed. The Union did not 
readmit Mississippi until 1870, and it was readmitted although it had not ratified the 
Thirteenth Amendment prior to readmission. The state had not considered itself violating 
the laws of a nation to which it did not belong. Afterward, the state continued to disregard 
the law to some degree as it had not ratified the Amendment until 1995; moreover, the 
exception clause was the prefect tool for manipulation. By declaring nearly everything a 
crime, the state could subject who it desired to slavery and involuntary servitude, once 
the criminal was ‘duly’ convicted.
Therefore, the vagrancy laws of the Mississippi's Black Codes did not operate to 
violate the Thirteenth Amendment as it had been abolished prior to the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, but the laws lived on through other means. Vagrancy laws, for a
l4j See generally Papachristou.
144 Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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long time, managed to utilize the punishment exception clause to undermine the entire 
Amendment. It was not until the 1930s that Supreme Court began its torrent of 
constitutional attacks on methods used to enforce vagrancy laws. Such attacks on what 
could be done under state police powers affected enforcement; however, Papachristou 
administered quite the strike to the effect of vagrancy laws, by effectively limiting the 
broad range of offenses covered under vagrancy statutes.
Vagrancy laws operated from the gray area overlap of police powers that faced 
restriction in beginning in the mid-twentieth century. It traveled from England and 
became customarily accepted. Although the statutory definitions presented many 
complications and challenges to the protection of constitutional rights, they survived 
fairly intact until the mid-twentieth century. Vagrancy was rampant and widespread in 
times of economic transition and new labor system incipience to ensure an adequate 
supply of labor.
The function of vagrancy laws of the Mississippi Black Codes fared no different; 
it ensured the labor supply for the economic transition of the state from slave labor to free 
labor. Amidst the transition, the laws descended upon the blacks, natives and migrants to 
the state, with blunt forces. The laws were not only designed to provide a pool of 
available labor, but to maintain the socioeconomic hierarchy that had existed before the 
Civil War disrupted life, not only in Mississippi but the South. When restrictions began to 
flood in from court rulings, Mississippi, like other states, had to find ways to create 
vagrancy laws that did not infringe on the constitutional rights of its citizen, and it did. 
Today, laws still exist in Mississippi’s Code that defined and punish those committing
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acts of vagrancy. It appears that the Thirteenth Amendment was ineffective then and 
remains so now.
Chapter 3: Peonage
In June 1924, two black men named George Diamond and Galvester Jackson 
began working for M.B. Davis (alias Mood Davis) at Camp Sanders in Florida. 
Approximately two weeks after they began their employment, Diamond and Jackson left, 
with permission, with a promise to retrieve Diamond’s family from River Junction to 
bring them to Camp Sanders. Camp Sanders was one of two farms operated by Davis.l4> 
The other turpentine farm146 was called Farmdale. Camp Sanders was ten miles west of a 
town named Wewahitchka and Farmdale was twenty-five miles southwest of the town.147 
To paint a visual picture of Wewahitcka, consider the following details. Wewahitchka is 
a town located in the panhandle of Florida, not very far from Panama City. It is known 
for its two unique features: twin lakes, almost identical in size -  the Dead Lakes and
148Tupelo Honey. The name comes from the Seminole language and means “two eyes.”
It is about 174 miles from Mobile, AL (212 miles in driving distance).
145 Daniel, 140.
146 It should be noted that turpentine is a hazardous substance. See U.S., Department of Health and Human 
Services, Center for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, “International 
Chemical Safety Cards,” http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcsneng/nengl063.html (accessed November 18, 
2015). It states different symptoms that may occurs as a result of contact with turpentine, to include skin 
irritation (redness and pain), respiratory irritation (coughing, shortened breathing, sore throat), and eye 
irritation (redness, pain and blurred vision). See also U.S., Department of Health and Human Services and 
U.S. Department of Labor, “Occupational Health Guideline for Turpentine,” (September 1978), 1. It 
expands on some of the information in the safety cards, stating that “greater exposure may result in 
“unconsciousness or death.”
147 Davis v. United States 12 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1926).
148 City of Wewahitchka: Home of Dead Lakes and Tulepo Honey, “Home,”
http://www.cityofwewahitchka.com/ (accessed February 24, 2016). According to the website, “The city's 
Seminole Indian name means "water eyes", and a view from the sky above reveals why — two almost
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The hunt began for the human capital that took leave and failed to return. On 
August 8, Diamond and Jackson, who had not yet returned to Camp Sanders, were 
arrested on charges of larceny of Davis’s property valued at $8.50, at the behest of Davis 
and taken to the county jail in Blountstown, Calhoun County. When Diamond and 
Jackson appeared before the court to plead their case, Davis was present. He made a 
statement insinuating that the defendants should plead guilty, for if they did not, they 
would be sentenced to eight months in prison. The defendants plead guilty.150 
Simultaneously, the court was also hearing a case against Henry Sanders, who was 
alleged to have committed larceny of the property of Charles Land’s brother, valued at 
$2.75; he also plead guilty. The judge ordered each of the defendants to be released on 
payment of costs. Davis paid the costs against each defendant - $37.28 total against 
Diamond and Jackson and $25 against Sanders -  and also assumed responsibility for a 
debt claimed against Sanders by Land’s brother amounting to $100. Having paid the 
costs, the defendants were released and Davis took them to Farmdale. There, Diamond, 
Jackson and Sanders were held upon their agreement to work of their debts, incurred 
when he paid their costs and debts as well as the additional indebtedness he initially 
claimed against Diamond and Jackson. Another laborer, by the name of Dewitt Stonan, 
was also being held for a debt.151
Up until the night of September 29, the four peons had remained under
surveillance and kept in compulsory service because they feared physical punishment and
perfectly round lakes nestled into the heart of this community add to the community's relaxed charm, and 
make a special backdrop to the city's downtown Lake Alice Park.”
149 Distance Between Cities, “Distance from Mobile, AL to Wewahitchka,” http://www.distance- 
cities.com/distance-mobile-al-to-wewahitchka-fl (accessed February 24, 2016).
150 Davis, 254-55.
151 Ibid., 255. Judge Bryan’s opinion suggest that there is no evidence reflecting that Stone had been 
criminally charged.
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further criminal prosecution; however, this would be the night of they intended to escape 
the clutches of peonage at the Farmdale turpentine farm. The wives of both Sanders and 
Stonan accompanied the four peons in making their escape, secretly leaving the farm in 
the darkness of night. The following morning, they went to the home of a woman named 
May Bell McGee in a town near Wewahitchka, where they left the women and continued 
on. They traveled around the town and stayed in the woods near West Arm highway 
bridge until night, when they planned to cross the bridge as night would decrease their
I S?chances of being caught and apprehended.
That same morning, Davis and his employees, Carey Whitfield, Frank Daniels, 
and Will Proctor, went to the town to search for the escaped peons. Davis, accompanied 
by another man, went to the home of Sander's father-in-law, Matthew Brown. Assured 
that Sanders was not there, Davis continued the hunt and headed up the road toward 
Blountstown. Following Davis’s departure, Brown went into his vehicle and began 
searching for his daughter; he found her and Stonan's wife at McGhee’s house. He 
intended to bring them to his home. He began this operation, but it was not completed. 
They encountered Davis and his employees who overtook them and captured the women, 
taking them back to Wewahitchka. There, Proctor took charge and kept watch over the 
captured women.1 ?3
After the ordeal, Davis consulted with Land, Whitfield and Daniels. Following the 
consultation, he departed with Land in Land's vehicle. That night, Whitfield and Daniels 
found and captured the escaped peons at the north end of the bridge. In less than half an 




defendants (Whitfield, Daniels, Proctor and Land), each one armed, collected Stonan, 
Diamond, Jackson and Sanders, had Stonan whip the others, and then put them in the 
vehicle and brought them back to Wewahitchka. Once there, the peons and the wives of 
the two already in Proctor’s charge were split up; Diamond was given to Land and the 
remaining peons and the two wives were returned to Farmdale.l?4
Within the following days, a series of events ensued, which led to the conviction 
of Davis, Land, Whitfield, Daniels and Proctor. Davis queried deputy marshal H. H. 
Bowles to learn what constituted peonage. Such a question led to Bowles’s permission to 
testify in court over objection. The case was heard in the District Court of the United 
States for the Northern District of Florida by Judge William B. Sheppard. The jury 
considered the following indictments: (1) “'holding Henry Sanders to a condition of 
peonage,” l5? which consisted of a single count; (2) "holding George Diamond, Galvester 
Jackson and Dewitt, [sic] Stonan in a condition of peonage,” 1?6 which consisted of four 
counts; (3) the arrest of and return to, “separately and severally, Diamond, Jackson, 
Sanders and Stonan, respectively, to a condition of peonage, in order to compel to work 
for Davis in payments of debt which they owed him,” l:>7 which consisted of eight counts, 
four for the arrest and four for the return; and (4) “aiding and abetting.” Davis was 
convicted on all the counts of the first, second and third indictments. He was sentenced to 
pay a fine of $500 and thirteen months of imprisonment. Land was convicted on the 












and one day of imprisonment. Whitfield, Daniels and Proctor were also convicted on 
several counts of the third indictment. The case was appealed, but certiorari was 
denied.159
This is just one type of scenario of debtors came to know the involuntary 
servitude system known as peonage. It was also another case in a string of peonage cases 
that began in 1902. Peonage, one of the many forms of involuntary servitude that 
occurred in the post-slavery era, is a topic that is under-discussed in the American 
historical narrative. While its roots are in Latin America, it took on a monstrous 
development of its own in the U.S.160 It appeared as an economic tool and relegation of 
blacks and immigrants to a second-class status.161
Peonage, defined most simply, is coerced servitude based on debt; the peon is the 
individual held in compulsory service against his or her will until the obligation of debt is 
fulfilled. Peonage, along with other systems created from local and state laws, were 
intrinsically forms of involuntary servitude. Peonage could develop within the context of 
private contractual relations or as the aftermath of a conviction by which the convicted
160 See e.g. Arnold J. Bauer, ‘"Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression,” 
The Hispanic American Historical Review 59, no. 1 (1979): 34-63; Harry E. Cross, “Debt Peonage 
reconsidered: A Case in study in Nineteenth-Century Zacatecas, Mexico,” Business History Review’ (1979): 
472-95; Donna J. Guy, “Women, Peonage, and Industrialization: Argentina, 1810-1914,” Latin American 
Research Review’ 16, no. 3 (1981): 65-89; Alan Knight, “Mexican Peonage: What Was It and Why Was 
It?,” Journal o f Latin American Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): 41-74; and Brian Loveman, “Critique of Arnold J. 
Bauer’s ‘Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression’,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 59, no. 3 (1979): 478-85. See also William Hirt Howe, “The Peonage Cases,” 
Columbia Law Review 4, no. 4 (1904): 279. See also “Violations of Federal Peonage Laws by State 
Statutes,” Virginia Law Review 2, no. 5 (1915): 386.
161 See generally Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery, also, see generally Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name.
162 N. Gordon Carper, “Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South,” Phylon 37, no. 1 (1976), 85. N. Gordon 
Carper suggests that peonage is involuntary servitude based on debt or “alleged debt or indebtedness.” He 
states, "The origins of peonage are as varied as they are complex. Through law, custom and racism as well 
as the political, economic and social chaos resulting from the Civil War-Reconstruction era, men were 
shackled physically and spiritually and compelled to labor for those who constituted the ‘Establishment’.”
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would be handed over to the care of a surety or leased to a private company; the latter
1 z  ̂
became known as convict-leasing.
Peonage, although abolished by law, existed well into the twentieth century 
because state and local governments enacted laws and permitted situations that carried 
the vestiges and badges of slavery or created a condition of peonage. The “peon” would 
not be identified as a slave. Nonetheless, he or she would be placed in situations, 
supported by law and enforced by the courts and law enforcement, that created peonage, 
thus utilizing the punishment exception clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to create 
laws that restricted freedom to move from employer to employer and made breach of 
contract and fraud statutory criminal offenses. It appears that there was a power struggle 
between state governments of the South and the federal government in governing the 
jurisdictions where the Thirteenth Amendment, or the statutes that were built from it, 
were not being followed.
American Peonage, An Overview
In an article examining the historical context of peonage in post-Civil War and 
Jim Crow Florida, N. Gordon Carper describes peonage -  how it came to exist and how it 
was an interlocking form of involuntary servitude that provided for and received from 
other forms of involuntary servitude: vagrancy, convict-leasing and the criminal-surety
l6'’ See generally Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name. Blackmon implies this connection his explanation 
of how people would enter the convict-leasing system, often under contractual obligation: the courts would 
contract with private parties to lease out convicts. Those who bid highest or took full advantage of this 
contractual opportunity tended to be industrial actors and officials of the government. See also 42 U.S.C.A. 
§1994. Within the language of the first section of the statute provides a legal definition: “the voluntary or 
involuntary service or labor o f any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or 
otherwise,” which most simply declares peonage as voluntary and involuntary servitude to pay off a debt. 
See also Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. “peonage.” Here, peonage is defined as a “condition of 
servitude (prohibited by 13th Amendment) compelling persons to perform labor in order to pay off a debt.”
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164system. One who owes a debt by way of contractual agreement can be subject to 
involuntary servitude because of what he owes. He reasons that some people did not owe 
a debt but would find themselves caught up in the peonage system. The social attitudes at 
the turn of the century were residual from the Civil War-Reconstruction Era.
Three patterns of peonage, according to Daniel, stretched across the South -  the 
cotton belt, the turpentine areas and railroad construction camps. The cotton belt 
consisted of land stretching from the Carolinas to Texas and included the Mississippi 
Delta. The turpentine camps and naval stores were abundant in northern Florida, southern 
Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. The railroad construction camps ran along three lines 
that intersected in Mississippi: the first extended from Mississippi to Florida, cutting 
through the turpentine belt; the second ran northward from the lower Mississippi River 
through Mississippi, Louisiana and Arkansas; and the intersecting line between the two, 
which accounts for the third line, ran from Mississippi through the cotton belt to South 
Carolina.165
The state and local laws were shaped by the attitudes and thus influenced the 
dynamic of the labor force procured by peonage. Carper’s statement identifies and 
proffers that the elements and tools that created and perpetuated peonage can be found in 
a plethora of contexts and influences that affected the United States during the period 
extending from the Civil War to post-Jim Crow. The justice system, legal system and law 




conditions that were in keeping with the ‘badges and incidents’166 of slavery. His 
statement also highlights the struggle historians, and scholars to some extent, have had 
with developing an expansive definition - the variety of origins of peonage. Historians 
and scholars often look to the origins to establish a clear starting point and identify 
patterns and changes to create a trajectory of origin to a contemporary understanding of 
their topic.
The Peonage Cases (1903) was a response issued to a grand jury who had 
question regarding peonage and involuntary servitude. The questions asked were material 
to three peonage cases that were before the federal courts: United States v. Lewis, United 
States v. Lewis and United States v. Clyatt.167 The jury was curious as to what elements 
constitute peonage and what constitutes involuntary servitude. Judge Jones, who 
delivered the response, declares, “Peonage was not slavery, as it formerly existed in this 
country. The peon was not a slave. He was a freeman, with political as well as civil
166 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 4, 19 (1905). Justice Brewer presents an example of the badges and 
vestiges of slavery in the following statement: “But that it was not the intent of the Amendment to 
denounce every act done to an individual which was wrong if done to a free man and yet justified in a 
condition of slavery, and to give authority to Congress to enforce such denunciation, consider the 
legislation in respect to the Chinese. In slave times in the slave States not infrequently every free Negro 
was required to carry with him a copy of a judicial decree or other evidence of his right to freedom or be 
subject to arrest. That was one of the incidents or badges of slavery.” Carrying around freedom papers as a 
prescribed action is a vestige/badge/relic/incident of slavery, as Justice Brewer sees it. See also Ibid., 32-3. 
Justice Harlan states, “But I stood with the court in the declaration that the Thirteenth Amendment not only 
established and decreed universal civil and political freedom throughout this land, but abolished the 
incidents or badges of slavery, among which, as the court declared, was the disability, based merely on race 
discrimination, to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, and to be a witness against 
a white person.” In this statement, he identifies rights that follow after the elimination of badges and 
vestiges of slavery. The rights that he mentions are those which were not permitted to slaves; thus, granting 
such rights to those who were once slave and became freedmen was to dismantle and eliminate some 
badges and vestiges of slavery.
167 W. Howe, 281.
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rights. He entered into the relation from choice, for a definite period, as the result of 
mutual contract. The relation was not confined to any race.” 168
In this statement. Judge Jones begins to draw the distinctions between peonage 
and slavery. In slavery, members of the Negro race were enslaved, children that were 
born to an enslaved mother and the condition of enslavement was lifelong. Enslaved 
Africans had no political or civil rights. They could not sue in court, enter into contracts 
or testify before a judge.169 While there are some badges o f slavery that seeped into the 
system of peonage, the two were not one and the same. It was necessary for him to do to 
clear misunderstandings and misconceptions. He continues to distinguish between the 
two, stating that the condition of peonage was not passed from parent to child and the 
service of the child could not be contracted away by his or her parent, with the exception 
or rare cases, and the terms of service was negotiable between the peon [laborer] and 
master [employer]. Judge Jones explains the voluntary and original nature of peonage, 
which clearly distinguishes it from chattel slavery, his initial reference for comparison.
After this explanation. Judge Jones concludes that this system of voluntary 
servitude was perverted by those who administered the law.171 The legal rights of peons 
were not carefully guarded against the wills and desires of their employers. On the
l<>x The Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671,673 (District M.D. Ala. 1903).
I(’g Trotter Jr., 64; White, Bay, and Martin, 59. The two aforementioned sources discuss colonial laws that 
subjugated blacks to the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, stripping them of political and civil rights as 
well as humanity. Some of the laws were enacted as early as 1661. Colonial Virginia enacted a law that 
made declared all blacks to be slaves and their condition of slavery was to be “durante vida,” for the 
duration of life, in simpler words, lifelong. See also Trotter, 77. He discusses the adoption of Slave Codes 
in Colonial America, which systematically deprived blacks of their civil and human rights and identified 
them as property.
170 The Peonage Cases, 673-74.
171 Ibid.. 674.
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contrary, Judge Jones finds that they were “unscrupulously disregarded.” Such 
administration was akin to another involuntary servitude system -  vagrancy, discussed at 
length in the previous chapter. Judge Jones finds that it “resulted in citizens becoming 
bound, in constantly increasing numbers and length of service, to compulsory ‘service or 
labor’ to coerce payment of debt or compel the performance of real or pretended 
obligations of personal service.” 17j In the losing battle, the peon found himself, or 
herself,174 performing involuntary servitude. Thus, the procedural mishandling of the 
peons’ rights perverted the system, from voluntary, into one of involuntary servitude.
Peonage was a peculiar system of labor. It was a system in which a person that 
was indebted to another would agree to work out the debt through a means of labor and 
coerced to remain in service until the debt was repaid. A person could enter debt through 
various means - an advance on transportation costs to work site, a debt incurred by one 
employer paying of the debt of a laborer to another employer, becoming part of the 
convict-leasing system, owing employers for providing basic human needs (clothing, 
shelter and food), etc. Once indebted, the term of service could be extended because the 
value of labor was often determined, or interpreted, by the employer. Not every person 
that entered into peonage endured lifelong servitude, some found relief through court 
remedy - rescission of the contract, release from contractual obligation, or release by 
nullification of the law that incriminates breach of contract.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Peonage was not a system of gender discrimination; both men and women worked on peonage farms. 
Women could perform services connected with domestic care, home economics and textile labor, or they 
could be subject to perform sexual services. A case discussed later in the paper is about a woman who runs 
a brothel and subjects her female laborers to compulsory sexual service.
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In the following narrative, which, according to Freedom on My Mind: A History 
o f African Americans, With Documents, first appeared in the Independent in 1904, there 
is a reflection on the state of peonage in the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century. A 
black peon shares his account and experience of peonage. He begins his account with a 
bit of information about him. He was born in Elbert County, Georgia during the war, but 
reveals that he is unclear of his age. He immediately begins discussing his experience of 
peonage. When the time came to settle accounts and discuss account balances, he learned 
that none of his debt nor that of other peons, which had accumulated over the course of a 
few years, had been settled; rather the debts accumulated to $100 or more. He owed the 
Senator, his obligor, $165.
He maintains that this information was according to the bookkeeper, implicitly 
disagreeing with the records. He expresses a sentiment that was a badge of slavery - 
refuting a white man. The apprehension that comes from refuting a white man had 
consequences as it was a disruption to the social order during slavery. He and the others 
were told that they may be released if they sign their acknowledgements; his desire to be 
released from the Senator's employ drove him to sign a document. The narrative reflects 
that he nor the other read it; instead, they signed it and went on their way, believing they 
were released. Shortly after they left, they were pursued and retrieved by a search party, 
which consisted of a constable and a number of men. They were confined in the Senator’s 
stockade and informed the next morning by the guards that papers they signed were not 
only an acknowledgement of their debt but also an agreement to continue their
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employment under the Senator until the debts were liquidated.17? The account given 
above is representative of the fact that a majority of blacks were uneducated. The lack of 
education is often to blame for them signing contracts, for they just had confidence in the 
“master’s” words.
As he explains above, they were willing to do anything, and he does not express 
that they read. Moreover, he says that the following morning the meaning of the 
acknowledgement was explained to them, instead of being free, they had signed on for a 
longer period of servitude. He also explains that the debt amounts did not change, or 
appear to change, at least. The account expressed above is an example of the system-wide 
effect of peonage. At no point did the justice system see an unfair bargaining advantage 
in the master-peon relationship or deception, misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the 
master. It is clear that the peon had not been aware of what he signed. According to the 
account of the black peon, he was: (1) informed that he might be released from his 
contractual obligation, should he sign the document, which had been revealed afterwward 
to be an acknowledgement of debt and an agreement to extend the term of contracted 
service; and (2) after signing and leaving that night, he was pursued, apprehended and 
imprisoned.
Apprehension and imprisonment of a peon is prohibited by the PAA. There is no
clear misrepresentation for telling him that he might be released and then placed in
servitude that would be deemed violative of the PAA. It is clear that he had signed (not
necessarily agreed to) an unconscionable contract, which should have been deemed void
by the court. In the final sentence of the above quote rests a striking statement. The peon
175 '‘A Negro Peon: The New Slavery in the South, 1904,” Independent (1904) provided in White, Bay and 
Martin, 476.
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declares that he and the other peons were treated like convicts. He makes no distinction 
between the slavery and peonage when regarding the conditions. While he can identify 
the legal term peon, he finds the condition of being a peon and being a slave to be the 
same thing. He suggests that no matter which name the “hell on earth” he was 
experiencing had been all the same to him.176 Thus, the badges of slavery, expressed in 
his narrative, existed, although the Thirteenth Amendment and additional legislation were 
aimed at ending them. At the foundation lies the contradiction found such laws and a 
political figure, the Senator, who had violated them.
Convict-Leasing, Legal Peonage
Convict-leasing existed as a legal form of peonage. It was administered by a 
justice of the peace. It served two purposes: 1) to accrue funds that were so desperately 
needed by local and county governments and provide cheap, or virtually free, labor to 
planters and corporations; and 2) terrorization of blacks to comply with white 
supremacy. Those who opposed so-called bargains or contracts were exposed to mob 
threats and terrorism. It was the misfortune of blacks that they would experience the 
horrors of such a system.
Carper suggests that there was a causal relationship between the convict leasing 
system and peonage and that the convict leasing system, in effect, provided labor the 
system of peonage. He finds vagrancy to be the origin of the labor pool.179 Vagrancy, 





arrested for idleness; if he could not furnish documentation as proof of gainful 
employment or provide a “good account,” he received a summary judgment and was 
imprisoned. Afterward, he would be leased out to the highest bidder. Following that, he 
would enter into peonage. If the service is extended beyond the term of the sentence, the 
condition of peonage is met. Since the process began with incrimination, he would be 
deprived of certain liberties normally reserved to free persons.
Carper interpreted from a statement made by the Assistant Attorney General of 
the United States, Charles W. Russell, in 1906, that a positive relationship existed in the 
convict-leasing system and peonage. According to Russell, once a person was tried and 
convicted, he would be “held in involuntary servitude by the man who has leased him.” 181 
The lessee would pay nothing for the leased person’s labor and the state would receive no 
money for the period in which the convict is “detained.” 182
“Everybody knows that the great bulk of convict is Negroes. Everybody knows 
the character of a Negro and knows that there is no punishment in the world that can take 
the place of the lash with him. He must be controlled that way.” This was the statement 
of a Sumter County, Alabama representative at the Alabama constitutional convention. 
The statement reveals so much -  a resistant ideology to any type of equality with blacks, 
justification for abuse towards blacks and a desire to wield and maintain control over the 
population once subject to political, social, economic and spiritual inferiority, protected 
by laws.183
180 Carper, 86.
181 U.S. Department of Justice, Report on Peonage, by Charles Russell, Assistant Attorney General 




On September 10, 1901, John Davis, a black man, set off to go to see his wife, 
Nora, who was in declining health. The season demanded working the farm from dusk to 
dawn; it was impossible to take care of Nora and their two children, so he sent them off 
to her mother’s home to be cared for while he remained home to take care of their farm. 
Although he was home and toiled to bring in their cotton crops, he made the decision to 
see Nora as she continued to live in her ailing condition. He feared her death was 
impending, though he prayed it would not come, especially before he could see her.
Davis traveled down the railway of the Center of Georgia rail line to a bend in the 
outskirts of Goodwater where he, and other blacks, knew the train would have to slow 
down; when it did, they aware of the possibility of jumping onto the empty cars and 
travel to various cities to include Goodwater, Alabama. Davis’s destination, and 
Birmingham.
Davis departed the train in Goodwater and continue his journey, pedestrianly 
during the dusk hours of the day. As he reached some homes a short distance away from 
the Goodwater train station, an officer of the law, Robert N. Franklin, called to him 
asking if he had any money. Franklin was an appointed constable of the town as well as a 
local businessman who ran a dry goods store. His question was a method of determining 
whether one was a vagrant. Davis responded that he had no money then quickly adjusted 
his answer to reflect that he had money, but none to spare. Franklin inquired when he was 
going to pay the money he was owed. Davis rebutted that he owed Franklin nothing.
184 Ibid., 117-22.
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Franklin walked off; however, Davis knew that it was not the last he would see of 
Franklin. I8~
Davis arrived at the home of Nora’s parents. A few hours after being united with 
his family, Franklin appeared at the house. This time, Franklin came demanding the 
money, telling Davis to pay him or he will be arrested; Davis refused his ultimatum, 
maintaining that he owed him nothing. Franklin left and returned with another constable, 
Francis M. Pruitt, who came claiming he had a warrant for Davis, which was never 
served upon him. Hours later, Davis had been locked in calaboose with four other 
blacks, who had been detained within the past forty-eight hours. Jesse London, the justice 
of peace, swiftly administered the case. The warrant identified Pruitt rather than Franklin 
as the victim of wrongful appropriation and Davis plead guilty. How or why is unknown. 
Nonetheless, he was ordered to pay a fine and court costs; the amount went unrecorded. 
Unable to pay, Davis was brought to John Pace's farm and forced into a contract with
187Pace -  his entry into peonage.
Davis's experience is an example of how one entered into legal peonage. The 
details of his cases were lost in memories as records of such proceedings were scant. 
Those accounts iterated in later indictments captured inconsistent details. It was under 
the name of crime and punishment that he entered a system of involuntary servitude, 











The conditions presented in the scenarios above are not fabricated illusions, but 
real conditions that laborers endured. The peon served until his time was complete (the 
expiration of term sometimes being his or her own expiration of life). The peon in the 
narrative provided in the section of this thesis titled, "‘American Peonage, An Overview'’ 
explained the conditions on the peonage farm. Some of the descriptions included filthy 
sleeping quarters, deaths of peons, at least two (he recalled) to have been killed by the 
guards for committing minor offenses, severe and brutal whippings, workdays were from 
dusk to dawn regardless of weather conditions and timed and rationed meals. The 
conditions of the peon farm where he labored possessed the badges of slavery. What does 
not appear in his account in any remedy or litigation of his case and situation; instead, he 
served his whole time there. The accounts of the medical examiners and prison 
inspectors, discussed by Douglas, reiterate these conditions. The connection between the 
conditions of peonage and convict-leasing imply that were shared rather than distinct and 
very much reminiscent of slavery.
The State’s Role in Peonage
Such accounts were not uncommon. A major source that permitted, and in some 
cases, allowed for maintenance of the system of peonage was the black codes' sections of 
various state laws. It was one of several tools used to create and perpetuate forms of 
involuntary servitude. The legislative actions of the Black Codes were retaliation against 
the victors of the Civil War to legalize a form of slavery and oppression amongst blacks,
189 “A Negro Peon,” 476-77. The reports of prison inspectors reflect similar conditions in the prison mines 
to which convict laborers were leased. See footnotes 72 and 75 for more details.
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thus exercising their police powers. It would not be until 1901, that such police powers 
would begin to be eclipsed and preempted by federal powers, modestly.
As Pamela Brandwein has noted, “Some referred simultaneously to the end of 
slavery and the continuation of it, despite its formal prohibition.” 190 Brandwein captures 
the perception of some that the powers of the Thirteenth Amendment would be limited; it 
was construed to not have done enough to combat all forms of slavery or involuntary 
servitude. The statement also addresses that some forms and systems of involuntary 
servitude - vagrancy, peonage and convict-leasing - persisted and states passed a set of 
laws that aided, if not supported these systems.
Alluding generally to the Black Codes, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts 
stated, "In several of these States new laws are being framed containing provisions 
wholly inconsistent with the freedom of the freedmen."191 Senator Wilson had identified 
the purpose and target of the Black Codes, which was to distinguish the black population 
that was in its jurisdiction and curtail their constitutional rights. The stringent set of laws 
was designed to restrict those freedoms granted by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Although the Thirteenth Amendment legally prohibited slavery and 
involuntary servitude, the Black Codes provided the South with legalized involuntary 
servitude by criminalizing breach of contract, restricting a laborer's right to choose 
amongst competing employers and failure to pay a debt.
Peonage and contract-based disputes that ended up in court had criminal penalties, 
although they are civil in nature. According to Judge Jones (1903), “On these lines
190 Pamela Brandwein, “Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congresses,” Law c£ Society 
Review 34, no. 2 (2000): 335.
191 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session 39 (1865), quoted in Brandwein (2000): 335.
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legislation cannot move at all, when the act complained of is not a crime, but the mere 
breach of the obligations of a contract... in all free governments the good sense of 
mankind, since the days when imprisonment for debt was abolished, has condemned and 
frowned down any attempt to coerce the performance of civil obligations by criminal 
penalties.” “ Such reasoning led the Court to declare invalid the Alabama statute that 
made breach of contract a crime. The construction of the Thirteenth Amendment did not 
wholly confront predisposition of unconscionable laws against blacks, thus allowing for 
the legislation of the Black Codes.
As noted already, the Black Codes functioned as a legal apparatus for continuing 
the condition of involuntary servitude for blacks. The ideology of the Supreme Court 
justices also played a significant role in ensuring this. Thomas Davis asserts that 
considerations of social and racial inequality and subjugation influenced the justices to 
declare the Civil Rights Acts of 1875 unconstitutional. The consensus of the decision, 8- 
1, reflects the ideology regarding the protection of citizens irrespective to race and class. 
The majority opinion reflects that such an enactment (the Civil Rights Act of 1875) is not
1 QTwithin congressional expression power of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment began to lose effectiveness. A striking feature of the 
decision is the Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which limited the 
Amendment’s ability to reach private actors. If it could not be applied to social
192 The Peonage Cases, 690-91.
I9' Thomas J. Davis, Race Relations in America: A Reference Guide with Primary Documents, (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2006), 109. See also Brandwein, 326. Brandwein discusses how the slave society 
operated -  meaning that blacks were to be denied personal and civil rights; much of that was reflected in 
the conservative political ideology. She further argues that the Moderate Republicans in the 39th Congress 
had even found that such social views and behaviors conflicted with republican government.
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situations,194 it also could not affect economic situations as well, which was what initially 
occurred with peonage.
The justice who delivered the majority opinion, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, stated 
that Congress could not declared such an enactment through authorization of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to stipulate what may be called “social rights of 
men and races.” 193 He further went on to exclaim that social discrimination was not 
aligned and did not signify any type of “slavery or servitude,” and to allow it to apply 
“every act of discrimination” to slavery arguments would make it redundant.196 
Nonetheless, the attitudes and policies of private whites were based on badges and 
incidents of slavery. Furthermore, scholars of the Thirteenth Amendment argue that the 
amendment applies to both private and state actors. However, in the historical 
perspective, the consensus shaped the jurisprudence based on the surrounding political, 
social and economic environments -  each expressing racial discrimination to some 
degree. Thus, the argument of the Thirteenth Amendment reaching private actors was not 
one considered by the majority opinion.
The influences and implications of this judicial opinion can be found in the legal 
systems of involuntary servitude, which appeared in a variety of ways, to include
194 Social situations refer to how blacks treated whites and how whites treated blacks. Blacks could be 
mistreated by whites and social situations and still needed to maintain a level of respect towards whites, or 
else they could risk injury or death. Congress even recognized a need to pass the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) Act 
of 1871 because it was aware of the KICK acting to demean, demoralize and kill black people.
195 Davis, Race Relations in America, 109.
196 Ibid. It should be noted that social discrimination of this sort, racial social discrimination, was a badge 
and relic of slavery. Since Bacon’s Rebellion and the passing of the law that provided slavery a racial 
foundation, which targeted Africans and those of African descent only, it was embedded into social 
interactions between whites and blacks.
197 George Rutherglen. “State Action, Private Action and the Thirteenth Amendment,” Virginia Law 
Review 94 (2008): 1367. See also “Violation of Federal Peonage Statutes by State Statutes,” Virginia Law 
Review 2, no. 5 (1915): 385-6; and Baher Azmy, “Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendments: Modern 
Slavery and a Civil Rights Agenda,” Fordham Law Review 1A (2002): 1043.
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peonage. Its suggestion that social discrimination did not violate the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments enabled Southern local and state legislatures to design legal 
mechanisms that used the suggestion as a foundation for the discrimination to follow -  
vagrancy, peonage, convict-leasing, criminal-surety, etc. Officers of the law worked 
cooperatively with private white citizens to ensure that blacks wound up in a condition of 
compulsory service.
Carper, among other historians and scholars, have found the Black Codes of 
southern states hosted a set of laws that were purposed on controlling the black
1 QRpopulation. Considering the historical context -  racism, badges and incidents of 
slavery, superior attitudes of Southern whites, desire to keep the social and economic 
systems that they have developed in place, refusal to be told to do otherwise by the 
federal government -  bring about an understanding of how to identify exactly who the 
legislatures intended to target. Embedded within the black codes of various Southern 
states was a set of laws that made breach of contract and fraud, or intent to, a criminal 
act. 199
Southern state legislatures passed statutes that were designed to keep the 
undesired population in a system similar to that of chattel slavery, to reinforce their 
socioeconomic hierarchy and to keep in place their traditions of superiority and respected 
(warranted or unwarranted).200 They reasoned that laws that called for compulsory action 
sanctioned by the courts to have the person who breached the contract detained and made 
criminal and replaces remedy for civil liability creates and satisfies, or at a minimum,
198 Other historians and scholars include Joe William Trotter Jr., Deborah Gray White, Mia Bay, Waldo E. 
Martin Jr., Douglas Blackmon, Pete Daniel, and Glen Rutherglen.
199 “Constitutional Law: Imprisonment for Debt: Peonage,” Michigan Law Review 6, no. 6 (1908): 504.
200 Trotter, 297.
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201sanctions a condition of peonage and held that it was invalid. Thus, the courts had 
interpreted the congressional power used to protect civil rights as having prohibited such 
actions.
Douglas is also sure to bring attention to the links between government and 
private interests. Government officials influence policy, and leveraged state policy and 
resources to their private interests. Alabama governor Robert M. Patton leased out 
convicts to a cover company -  legitimate on paper, but functions as a concealer -  which 
had called itself Smith and McMillan; the lease was controlled in part by a company that 
Patton would become president of three years later, the Alabama and Chattanooga
Railroad. Former Confederate officials also engaged in the leasing. Politics leaned more
202in the interests of commerce than protecting individual rights.
Alabama, a Domicile for Peonage
Like other Southern states, Alabama found itself before the Supreme Court of the 
United States quite a few times in the first half of the twentieth century. Twice, Alabama 
found itself before the federal court in 1903 for the Peonage Cases. Alabama also went 
before the Court with respect to its handling of Bailey’s cases, once in 1908 and again in 
1911. Again, Alabama found itself before the Court in United States v. Reynolds in 1914. 
Alabama seemed to frequent the Supreme Court during the Progressive Era, primarily 
because it enacted statutes that the Court found unconstitutional and in violation of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.
201 “Violation of Federal Peonage Laws by State Statutes,” Virginia Law Review 2, no. 5 (1915): 386-87.
202 Blackmon, 53-4.
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The courts in Alabama initially acted against statutes that regulated contractual 
relations. In 1887, the Alabama Supreme Court heard two cases appealed from Pike 
County on the same day, July 11. The first case, Smith v. State (1887), concerned a man 
who was charged with violating a social law. Green Smith was tried and convicted for 
using “abusive, insulting and obscene language” in the presence of females. M.C. 
Enfinger moved to be his surety for the fine of $10 and court costs. Smith signed a 
contract, which included in its provisions that he would have to work off the fine, court 
costs and advances made to him before he could satisfy his debt and be released from 
labor.203
The court ruled fines and costs are not included in the Alabama constitutional 
definition of debt regarding the “imprisonment for debt” clause;204 therefore, the court 
could have imprisoned Smith. However, the debt had been satisfied before the debtor 
moved from the custody of the prosecutor to the custody of the contracting master; the 
remaining debt -  advance -  cannot be coerced upon the debtor. The court noted that 
holding a convict until he has liquidated his debt is “imprisonment for debt” within the 
constitutional meaning and illegal; thus, the holding Smith for the debt he owed for 
advances constituted involuntary servitude. The court reversed the decision and 
remanded it to the lower court.205
Wynn v. State (1887) was the second case the court heard. Monroe Wynn, a minor 
was convicted on a charge of petit larceny. M. D. Floyd moved to be his surety to pay off 




Sm ith  v. S ta te , 82 Ala. 40, 41.
The clause expressed a violation of the law if one was imprisoned for a debt. 
Ibid.
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he liquidated the debt. Wynn began his labor but not as efficiently as Floyd wanted. After 
repeated attempts to have him do so, Floyd sought and attained a warrant for Wynn. The 
court refused to observe that Wynn was a minor and had a right to not uphold the 
contract. The court cited Smith, which it had ruled on earlier in the day, and maintained 
that a person could not be held in service to liquidate debt for advances as doing so would 
constitute involuntary servitude. The court also noted that the state law under which the 
case was brought recognized leaving or escaping for service as a misdemeanor but make 
no provision for inefficient service. The court reversed the decision, but did not remand 
the case, and released Wynn.
Such judicial victories on behalf of debtors were short-lived. The social attitudes 
of white-influenced government control over the black population in Alabama, as it 
arguably had done in other Southern states. Whites viewed blacks as useful, 
indispensable workers that lacked accountability and were irresponsible; they also viewed 
blacks as creatures prone to criminal activity, if not employed. They acted in a manner 
that discredited the honesty and integrity of a black person’s testimony or accounts of 
incidents, whether actively or passively. Such attitudes and beliefs persisted from the 
antebellum period through Reconstruction into the Progressive Era.
Reforms that came before the government in Birmingham contained four issues in 
controversy regarding the “Negro Problem,” as Carl V. Harris puts it: 1) regulation of 
black saloons; 2) vagrancy law enforcement; 3) government use of the convict-labor
" ’ Wynn v. State, 82 Ala. 55.
207 Carl V. Harris, “Reforms in Government Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama, 1890-1920,” 
The Journal o f  Southern History 38, no. 4 (1972): 568.
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system; and 4) the county fee system. Blacks had become a commodity to be fought 
over by special interest groups, like an object fought over by children for possession, 
each contending for their interest in what should be done with the object. The lawmakers 
are like the parents or mediators, managing the allocation of the object to whoever comes 
up with the most convincing argument or reason.
The growing industrial sector in Birmingham attracted black and white laborers 
seeking employment. The large corporations depended on black laborers to perform 
menial tasks -  coal and ore mining and railroad construction among other jobs.209 The 
economic structure included blacks at the base; socioeconomically, they were the wrung 
of society. Corporate and middle-class white interests aligned with strict enforcement 
of vagrancy laws. Though labor union organized movements to combat strict 
enforcement of vagrancy laws for fear of the impact on all laborers, their attempts were 
unsuccessful.211
World War I interrupted vagrancy law enforcement, which had become relaxed 
due the war. Vagrancy enforcement resurged toward the end of 1920. Vagrancy operated 
as a mode for the disadvantaged to enter into convict-leasing. Convict-leasing programs 
were supported by both the city and corporate interests. It covered the expenses accrued 
for prison maintenance and care for the convicts. It also cost corporations less to lease 
convicts than to hire free laborers.
Since the fees were used to pay civil servants of the justice system and law 










convict-leasing, it had been supported. However, support shifted in 1913 as convict­
leasing revenue could no longer cover funds used to pay civil servants, law enforcement 
officials and witnesses. Corporate interests moved from supporting the fee system to 
developing and supporting an anti-fee system in Jefferson County, claiming that law 
officials harassed black workers, which produced an adverse effect on the available black
717laborer population.
Those with corporate interests were concerned with the availability of cheap 
labor. Those in the social environment were concerned with government control over 
blacks. Amidst the clash, blacks became entangled in systems of involuntary servitude to 
protect the interests -  social, economic and commercial -  of the dominant white class.
Federal Cases Dealing with Peonage
The first case, United States v. Clyatt (1905) brought to the Supreme Court 
regarding peonage had failed to produce a conviction; nonetheless, it was successful in 
testing the constitutionality of the PAA. The PAA proved valid and cases began to 
appear before the Court. The background of the peonage landmark case, Bailey v. 
Alabama (1911) is a storied one. Alonzo Bailey had brought suit before the Court once in 
1908. He had been denied habeas corpus after being convicted of violating an Alabama 
statute that declared breach of a labor contract without having repaying the money as an 
intent to defraud the employer and denied the defendant the opportunity to present their 
testimony. The burden of proof had not lain on the prosecuting party since the act of 
breach of contract without repaying the money served as prima facie evidence, which
2,2 Ibid., 582-599.
21J See generally Clyatt.
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made conviction easier. The law effectively circumvented due process by precluding a 
defendant’s right to testify and defend himself.214
In the first case, Bailey v. Alabama (1908), the Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Alabama Supreme Court. The Court heard Bailey as a writ of error case, but determined 
that Bailey’s treatment was not an error of the court. It reasoned that the court could act 
within its own volition to determine how it would precede to handle a case -  denying the 
writ of habeas corpus motioned on behalf of Bailey. The claim against the Alabama law 
that had made criminal the contract breach -  intent to defraud -  lack sufficient evidence 
for the Court to test the law.216 Therefore, Alabama was victorious this round; however, 
Bailey and his support system refused to give up.
Bailey returned again in 1911 to the Supreme Court with his contender, Alabama. 
The law that made intent to defraud prima facie evident or criminal intent was yet again 
before the Court. The Court recognized that Bailey’s previous case was prematurely 
brought before it, and intended to hear the case and review the constitutionality of the 
Alabama statute that placed Bailey in jail.216 Justice Hughes, who had delivered the 
opinion, traced the intent of the law prior to and after amendment, noting that conviction 
was difficult before amendment because intent to defraud needed to be proven. The lack 
of direct evidence to make a judgment made indictment and conviction near impossible, 
as a breach of contract did not constitute an intent to injure or defraud.217
214 Daniel, 67.
215 Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 452-55 (1908).
216 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 229 (1911). Justice Hughes recites the language regarding crime in the 
Alabama statute: “And the refusal of any person who enters into such a contract to perform such an act or 
service, or refund such money, or pay for such property without just cause, shall be prima facie evidence of 
the intent to injure his employer, or to defraud him.”
217 Bailey, 232.
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After the amendments to the Alabama statute, the refusal or failure to pay back 
money or perform service that one was contracted for constituted prima facie evidence 
for intent to injure or defraud. The Court found that this was not invalid if the violator 
was permitted the opportunity to testify on his or her own behalf. However, the 
Alabama statute denied Bailey testimony. Such a statute was repugnant to the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the PAA; the PAA also nullified laws that sought to submit a 
person to peonage, which is what the Alabama stature effectively did." Essentially, a 
state could not utilize its police power to create laws that are intent upon providing a 
nexus to slavery and involuntary servitude. Therefore, the Court nullified the Alabama 
statute. Justice Holmes, who had delivered the opinion on Bailey’s first case in 1908, 
held the position that the punishment exception clause permits states to enact statutes that
criminalize acquisition of money under false pretenses, thus, subjecting the convict to
221slavery and involuntary servitude.
J.A. Reynolds along with B. W. Broughton appeared before a U.S. district court, 
indicted for violation of the PAA. Reynolds and Brought were indicted for having held a 
convict laborer, Ed Rivers (convicted for petit larceny), in a condition of peonage. 
Reynolds stood as surety for Rivers in court and paid his court costs and fees, assigned to 
Rivers by the court in accordance with his conviction. Rivers entered a written contract 
with Reynolds to perform labor for nine months and twenty-four days. He worked for one 
month and two days, then refused to continue to perform labor. Reynolds petitioned the
2,8 Bailey, 236-39.
219 Bailey, 236.
22u Bailey, 240-45. Justice Homes notes that slavery meant more than chattel slavery, as the language was 
adopted from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which guarantees the civil freedoms of all persons. 
Furthermore, he states that involuntary servitude’s definition is broader than that of slavery.
221 Bailey, 245-50.
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county court for a warrant and one was issued for Rivers. Rivers was again before the 
county court. This time, Broughton offered to be his surety and Rivers entered into a 
contract with him for fourteen and one-half months. As with Rivers, Broughton stood as 
surety for E. W. Fields, who had been convicted for selling a mortgaged property. Fields 
entered into a written labor contract with for a term of nine months and twenty-nine days. 
He refused to labor after two months under this contract after allegedly enduring threats 
of arrest and imprisonment. Broughton did as Reynolds had done and secured a warrant
for Fields, whereupon Fields was arrested. They were brought up on indictment charges;
222however, the court found Reynolds and Broughton not guilty.
The Supreme Court reviewed this case as it had reviewed Bailey, ruling that states 
cannot make laws to circumvent constitutional provisions and federal enactment; 
moreover, states cannot pass laws that are repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment and 
the PAA, which was enacted to enforced the Thirteenth Amendment against peonage as a 
form of involuntary servitude. Justice Day, who delivered the opinion, identified the 
criminal-surety system in the actions of Reynolds, Broughton and the county court, 
sanctioned by Alabama law and found it unconstitutional under Thirteenth Amendment 
and the PAA. Justice Holmes, who had dissented in Bailey (1911), reluctantly agreed that 
the criminal-surety system was unconstitutional.
A woman named Aurelia P. Bernal encountered another woman, Rosenda Nava. 
Nava, a Mexican alien, had been employed as a domestic servant earning four dollars per 
week in Laredo, Texas. Bernal, marketing herself as a small hotel proprietor in San 
Antonio, Texas to Nava, offered employment as a chambermaid with a wage of six
222 United States v. Reynolds, 213 F. 352. See also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 138-40.
223 Reynolds, 235 U.S^ 133, 143-49.
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dollars per week, an increase of two dollars per week. She told her that if she had not 
liked the work and wanted to leave, she would pay her fare back to Laredo. Nava 
accepted the proposition and began employment.224
Bernal brought Nava to a brothel to perform acts of prostitution. Nava refused to 
perform acts of prostitution. Bernal refused to release her until she paid back the fare 
from Laredo to San Antonio. She threatened that she would contact immigration and have 
Nava taken into custody, whereupon she would serve five years in prison. Nava was able 
to contact one of her cousins while out on errands. Her cousin sent a friend with a police 
officer to Bernaf s brothel to seek out Nava. The friend and police requested Nava’s 
presence and Bernal replied that no one by that name was there; however, Nava made 
herself known and was taken from the brothel by the police officer and brought back to 
her family.22'
While working for Bernal, Nava and another woman named Sofia Vivar 
performed all of the domestic work. Nava was not given much to eat nor was she 
compensated for the work she performed. In all, three women were in service to Bernal, 
but Nava appeared to have been the only one coerced into service.226 A case was brought 
Bernal for holding Nava in peonage. Bernal was convicted for having held Nava in a state 
of peonage.-" In response, Bernal brought suit against the U.S. government, Bernal v. 
United States (1917), claiming the court erred in its judgment. The court reviewed 11 
assignments of error cited by Bernal, all of which were denied by the court. The court 










The federal courts had been presented with opportunities. In some instances, it 
restricted its ability due to lack of evidence or technicality. Nevertheless, there were some 
victories for victims of peonage. The courts had proven that justice could be served for 
victims of peonage. How long it would hear peonage cases was a different matter 
entirely.
Peonage After 1920
States actively sought to undermine the federal government's enforcement of the 
law. Throughout the 1910s and even in the 1920s, the Court had taken an active role in 
striking down laws and convicting violators that contributed to the plague of peonage. 
However, as implied by Daniel, the fire that burned so bright during the 1910s and the 
1920s had been dampened, and over time, it had extinguished. Resources had to be 
allocated elsewhere and the hope of eradicating peonage entirely had been oversight^- 
Peonage had to be rooted from the tucked away pockets of the Deep South. That was an 
impossible task.
Conclusion
The inquiry that this thesis has investigated -  Was it possible that states may 
manipulate through legislative enactments to punish via crime a target population and 
submit them to slavery and involuntary servitude? -  has argued that it was indeed 
possible. It is implied in the sources reviewed that states in the South accomplished this 
feat. Peonage ran rampant across the South in three areas: the cotton belt, the turpentine
228 Daniel, 147-48, 190-91.
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area and railroad construction lines. Laborers became peons through the means of 
contracts enforced by labor-contract statutes. Laborers also became peons through 
convict-leasing. They were often brought up on vagrancy or minor criminal infractions 
and leased to corporations. Vagrancy, protected fiercely by the states, often created legal 
entry way into peonage, convict-leasing and criminal-surety. Criminal statues were 
enacted as part a broader scheme in the South to uphold and maintain white supremacy. 
Social laws were enacted to uphold the sanctity of white women while devaluing black 
women into sexual deviants that lacked legal protection as well as other laws that 
prescribed racial etiquette, leveraged against blacks and supported white supremacy. 
They were also enacted to ensnare immigrants within the systems of forced labor, though 
the focus was primarily on blacks.
Was there any motivation for it? Racial oppression and socioeconomic hierarchy 
protection and reinforcement as well as economic hardship motivated the persistence of 
involuntary servitude in various forms. Government officials who had not believe blacks 
to be their equals were adamant about maintaining the pre-Civil War social hierarchy; 
moreover, blacks were perceived as revolting, criminally inclined, evil creatures that 
needed white supervision. Justification for abuses stemmed from recollections of slavery 
-  its social acceptance and legal enforcement. Involuntary servitude was another means 
by which they could relive slavery and retain their superiority. Cheap labor often led 
planters and industrialist to seek out convicts for lease. They were also inclined to seek 
out immigrants for the same purpose. Moreover, the convict-leasing and peonage 
provided labor and funds to private actors and governments, respectively.
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States enacted laws that criminalized black life, threatened whites that went 
against it and trapped immigrants as they were a source of cheap labor. Blacks happened 
to be the primary targets. Whether expressed or implied, this inquiry has revealed that a 
possibility to exploit the punishment exception clause to punish a target population exists. 
Stronger is the support that states had manipulated the punishment exception clause. 
Clyatt, Bailey, Reynolds and Papachristou are examples of cases that discovered state 
sponsorship and permission of involuntary servitude in its various forms. The accounts 
discussed in this thesis represent a small number of cases, though most were unrecorded 
or received and never examined. Nonetheless, involuntary servitude existed, largely 
through criminal sanction, at great benefit to the governments and industrial-commercial 
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Appendix I
From Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1489-1490.
The amendment proposed by Senator Saulsbury is as follows:
Sec. 1. All persons shall have the right peaceably to assemble and worship God according 
to the dictates of their own conscience.
Sec. 2. The use of the public press shall not be obstructed; but criminal publications made 
in one State against the lawful institutions of another State shall not be allowed.
Sec. 3. The right of citizens to free and lawful speech in public assemblies shall not be 
denied. Access of citizens to the ballot box shall not be obstructed either by civil or 
military power. The military shall always be subordinate to the existing judicial authority 
over citizens. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended in the 
presence of the judicial authority.
Sec. 4. The militia of a State or of the United States shall not be employed to invade the 
lawful rights of the people of any of the several States; but the United States shall not be 
hereby deprived of the right and power to defend and protect its property and rights 
within the limits of any of the States.
Sec. 5. Persons held to service or labor for life, in any State under the laws thereof, may 
be taken into any Territory of the United States south of north latitude 36° 30', and the 
right to such service or labor shall not be impaired thereby, and the territorial Legislature 
thereof shall have the exclusive right to make and shall make all needful rules and 
regulations for the protection of such right and also for the protection of such persons; but 
Congress or any territorial Legislature shall not have power to impair or abolish such 
right of service in the said Territory while in a territorial condition without the consent of 
all the States, south of said latitude, which maintain such service.
Sec. 6. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, shall not be permanently established 
within the District set apart from the Seat of government of the United States; but the 
right of sojourn in such District with persons held to service or labor for life, shall not be 
denied.
Sec. 7. When any territory of the United States south of north latitude 36° 30' shall have a 
population equal to the ratio of representation for one member of Congress, and the 
people thereof shall have formed a constitution for a republican form of government, it 
shall be admitted as a State into the Union, on an equal footing with the other States; and 
the people may, in such constitution, either prohibit or sustain the right to involuntary 
labor or service, and alter or amend the constitution at their will.
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Sec. 8. The present right of representation in section two, article one, of this Constitution, 
shall not be altered without the consent of all the States maintaining the right to 
involuntary service or labor south of latitude 36° 30', but nothing in this Constitution or 
its amendments shall be construed to deprive any State south of said latitude 36° 30' of 
the right of abolishing involuntary servitude at its will.
Sec. 9. The regulation and control of the right to labor or service in any of the States 
south of latitude 36° 30' is hereby recognized to be exclusively the right of each State 
within its own limits; and this Constitution shall not be altered or amended to impair this 
right o f each State without its consent; Provided, This article shall not be construed to 
absolve the United States from rendering assistance to suppress insurrections or domestic 
violence, when called upon by any State, as provided in section four, article four, of this 
Constitution.
Sec. 10. No State shall pass any law in any way interfering with or obstructing the 
recovery of fugitives from justice, or from labor or service, or any law of Congress made 
under article four, section two, of this Constitution; and all laws in violation of this 
Section may, on complaint made by any person or State, be declared void by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.
Sec. 11. A sa  right of comity between the several States south of latitude 36° 30’ 
the right of transit with persons held to involuntary labor or service from one State to 
another shall not be obstructed, but such persons shall not be brought into the States north 
of said latitude.
Sec. 12. The traffic in slaves with Africa is hereby forever prohibited on pain of 
death and the forfeiture of all the rights and property of persons engaged therein; and the 
descendants of Africans shall not be citizens.
Sec. 13. Alleged fugitives from labor or service, on request, shall have a trial by 
jury before being returned.
Sec. 14. All alleged fugitives charged with crime committed in violation of the law 
of a State shall have the right of trial by jury, and if  such person claims to be a citizen of 
another State, shall have a right of appeal or of a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
Sec. 15. All acts of any inhabitant of the United States tending to incite persons 
held to service or labor to insurrection or acts of domestic violence, or to abscond are 
hereby prohibited and declared to be a penal offense; and all the courts of the United 
States shall be open to suppress and punish such offenses at the suit of any citizen of the 
United States or the suit of any State.
Sec. 16. All conspiracies in any State to interfere with lawful rights in any other 
State, or against the United States, shall be suppressed; and no State, or the people
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thereof, shall withdraw from this Union without the consent of three-fourths of all the 
States, expressed by an amendment proposed and ratified in the manner provided in 
article five o f the Constitution.
Sec. 17. Whenever any State wherein involuntary servitude is recognized or 
allowed shall propose to abolish such Servitude, and shall apply for pecuniary assistance 
therein, the Congress may in its discretion grant such relief not exceeding one hundred 
dollars for each person liberated. But Congress shall not propose such abolishment or 
relief to any State.
Congress may assist free persons of African descent to emigrate and colonize
Africa.
Sec. 18. Duties on imports may the imposed for revenue; but shall not be excessive 
or prohibitory in amount.
Sec. 19. When all of the several States shall have abolished slavery, then and 
thereafter slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall never 
be established or tolerated in any of the States or Territories of the United States, and 
they shall be forever free.
Sec. 20. The provisions of this article relating to involuntary labor or servitude
shall not be altered without the consent of all the States maintaining such servitude.
99
Appendix II
The table provided the dates of ratification by the states up until the date of 
constitutional adoption, December 6, 1865.229
Table 2 Thirteenth Amendment Ratification
Table 2 Thirteenth Amendment Ratification by
State
Numerical
order of State Date of Ratification
ratification
1 Illinois Feb 1,1865
2 Rhode Island Feb 2, 1865
3 Michigan Feb 3, 1865
4 Maryland Feb 3, 1865
5 New York Feb 3, 1865
6 Pennsylvania Feb 3, 1865
7 West Virginia Feb 3, 1865
8 Missouri Feb 6, 1865
9 Maine Feb 7, 1865
10 Kansas Feb 7, 1865
11 Massachusetts Feb 7, 1865
12 Virginia Feb 9, 1865
13 Ohio Feb 10, 1865
14 Indiana Feb 13, 1865
15 Nevada Feb 16, 1865
16 Louisiana Feb 17, 1865
17 Minnesota Feb 23, 1865
18 Wisconsin Feb 24, 1865
19 Vermont Mar 8, 1865
20 Tennessee Apr 7, 1865
21 Arkansas Apr 14, 1865
22 Connecticut May 4, 1865
229 U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation, 
Centennial Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,” report prepared by 
the Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 30. Oregon, California, Florida, Iowa, New 
Jersey, Texas, Delaware, Kentucky and Mississippi ratified the amendment after the three-fourths 
ratification threshold was met. Mississippi was the last state to ratify. Although, its legislature ratified the 
amendment in 1995, the notification was not received by the archivist until 2012, which officially marks 
the state’s ratification.
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23 NewHampshire Jul 1, 1865
24 SouthCarolina Nov 13, 1865
25 Alabama Dec 2, 1865
26 NorthCarolina Dec 4, 1865
27 Georgia Dec 6, 1865
Table 2
Adapted from The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation, Centennial 
Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,” report prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 30.
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Additional Primary Sources can be viewed at Alabama Department of Archives and 
History. “Using Primary Sources in the Classroom: Reconstruction Unit.“ May 23, 2012, 
http://www.archives.alabama.gov/teacher/recon/reconl.html.
